I’ve been getting hits on my blog with keywords of Adam Lanza and Sandy Hook and other keywords related to organized stalking, mind control, gangstalking, mkultra and so on. I guess some of targeted individuals suspect that he was a victim of such harassment. What is important to realize at this point there is nothing to tie Adam Lanza tragedy to organized stalking or anything related to mind control. One can only speculate about motives, injustice or pressures Adam was facing before the tragedy. Information that is available on the shooter himself or his behavior is so scarce that it’s almost impossible to assess him as personality or individual. Information that is presented can’t be validated or confirmed, not to mention a lot of information is contradictory or conflicting. We have some pieces of the puzzle where we’re expected to fill the blank spaces ourselves.
Focus has been placed on the guns, not Adam’s life as if somehow guns influenced the tragedy. Logically it doesn’t make whole a lot of sense. If Adam didn’t have access to guns he could have used machete, chefs-knife, box-cutter, hammer or any other instrument to deliver his vengeance. Aggression is almost always expression of frustration, but we do not have information what was causing real, imagined or perceived obstructions in Adam’s life. If guns are evil hardware that kills people – this premise should apply to military or any authority figure as well.
So whatever it is we can look at it as effect based operation, where focus is to implement changes leading to second order effects (like a tighter regulation of guns or population mental health screenings). I don’t want to speculate about third order effects that this tragedy might lead to.
Strangely enough nobody tried to tie the tragedy to terrorism, lone wolf theories, violent extremism or rapid radicalization. Focus is not on the individual who caused the tragedy, but the push of dialectical thesis and antithesis (pro-gun and anti-gun) that had nothing to do with the tragedy itself. At the same time debates about social issues can’t be dismissed as tactic to divert attention from the core issue – why Adam Lanza felt so wronged that the only way for him to express his point was to kill little children and mother who raised him, not to mention all lose ends in the story.
Trying to explain the tragedy based on “evil gene” is just funny and at the same time very scary as it portrays people as instinct driven soulless robots who’s cognition and reasoning is product of genetics.
Another issue that is being raised – Adam Lanza mental health. It’s also purely speculative, based on unnamed sources and hearsay. Blame game is therapeutic, but can never be transcending as its usually just manifestation of preexisting stereotypes. Of course no rational person would agree that actions attributed to this person Adam Lanza (who we can’t even verify that he existed to begin with) would fit in “normal behavior” category.
One has to pay attention to that snake oil psychiatrist who claimed being his doctor. That trail leads to CIA’ s Men Who Stare at Goats department.
So my question – was tragedy catalyst for debate about social change or debate serves as distraction from tragedy (as it fills the void of uncertainty)?
One doing research into organized stalking can’t dismiss psychiatry as it’s very closely related to the core of the problem as persistent psychological harassment is hell bent to drive you crazy or make you appear as mentally ill if you try to describe the abuse. Psychiatry could be called as one of the gatekeepers of the problem. Not to mention they will be drawing public funds to care for manufactured psychiatric symptoms (if it gets to the breaking point) for the rest of targeted individual’s life.
The difference between what it is in reality and what we think it is could be hard to measure by observable criteria if looking only from targeted individual’s perspective. Coercive nature of psychiatry was used and abused by democracies and dictatorships alike throughout the ages. So at this point it’s not important what you do – what is important what others (referenced by someone who has a motive) think/interpreted/misinterpreted that you do that made you a target.
Interesting new trend where number (full report local copy) of state hospital beds in America has plummeted to 1850 levels and number of state psychiatric beds decreased by 14% from 2005 to 2010, falling to 43,318 beds in the United States, less than 5% of the beds available in 1955, the peak year of psychiatric hospitalization. It would be interesting to compare overall spending for mental health care if it’s decreasing or increasing as to relation to inpatient treatment statistics. Maybe it somehow related to gangstalking/organized stalking, which appears to be gaining traction.
Maybe it’s relevant to examine outpatient and community psychiatric care programs that exist in liberal democracies. Initiation algorithm into one of these programs is explained in Locus Training Manual (used by community psychiatrists) (local copy), which is not prescriptive, but descriptive in terms of resources and level of intensity for care needed for mentally ill according to real or perceived symptoms.
“This would allow clients to be assessed without regard to diagnosis and regardless of their presenting problems, thus making this a particularly advantageous tool for use with the co-occurring disorders.”
Sentence particularly ambiguous. Various levels of care only describe intensity or resources that will be dedicated towards “client” who needs them. One of intensive community type programs is Assertive Community treatment. It is especially relevant as one of the negative effects, possibly related to the coercive elements of the treatment, is the increased incidence of suicide rates. It’s for people that are seriously mentally ill and even though none of the targeted individuals smear feces on their walls one has to consider possibility of being portrayed or projected into such category. Reading into Assertive community treatment (ACT or PACT) it’s hard to understand what exactly does it do, but some critiqued coercive aspects of program (local copy) (The Origins of Coercion in “Assertive Community Treatment A Review of Early Publications from the “Special Treatment Unit (STU) of Mendota State Hospital”). Following excerpts that sounds exactly like mobbing is from “treatment” from one of the founders of program earlier work. I’m not even posting their work on experimenting with electric cattle prods as punishment devise. It displays the attitude towards fellow human being. What is strange is the predisposition that mobbing will be occurring outside of the treatment.
During the first session heavy canvas mittens were placed on the patient. … The staff (five or more) people would sit very close to patient with a young female within striking distance. The patient was required to sit in an armchair throughout. …. During the base rate week the staff quickly developed a consistent provocative approach in order to ensure a high frequency of behavior from the patient and be generalizable to the frustrations she would encounter outside of treatment. This consistently involved:
1) ignoring the patient in conversation;
2) refusing to give the patient candy or snacks when others were eating them;
3) denying all requests, for example, during the session if she asked if she would be able to go for a walk that afternoon, she was immediately told, “No you can’t.”;
4) refusing to accept her apologies or believe her promises of good behavior;
5) The above mentioned female sitting next to her often leading the provocation;
6) using provocative labels for her behavior, i.e., “animalistic, low grade”;
7) discussing family related frustrations, i.e., her mother’s refusal to write or visit, how her dead grandmother would be displeased with her present behavior if she were alive. It should be noted that throughout the program the patient was kept in a seclusion room at all times except when involved in a baseline or treatment session.
In sum, rude, aggressive, artificial incitement by the staff was used to provoke an angry response from the patient; this elicited behavior then was used as a representation of the allegedly natural unprovoked, “baseline” assaultive behavior of the client.
Now a bit of insight into treatment Program at the STU (special treatment unit) called “provocative therapy” that also sounds like form of mobbing or gangstalking:
Although brainwashing procedures at first appear alien to healing practices, they are indeed often similar in terms of techniques and desired goals. … Given these considerations, we have formulated a group designed to produce the maximal amount of emotional response and arousal in patients. In general, the group leader openly confronted patients with taboo topics and voiced criticisms of an unsympathetic society toward their deviant attitudes and behaviors. The crazy behaviors of patients were parodied and caricatured. Patients were badgered, pestered, confronted, challenged, derogated, ridiculed, and belittled in an effort to provoke protest, anger, irritation, discomfort and self-assertion.
The ACT inventors have continued to resist seeing their so-called treatment as the problem itself. In fact, against published evidence to the contrary (some of it quoted in the present article), they deny ever-using coercive methods in ACT.
It’s hard to tell if such programs of aggressive community treatment is used as a tool to designate, stigmatize and institutionalize people behind their back, but considering the complexity of the issue and subjectivity of what is normal and what is not, you have to look into practice of the program:
What does the PACT program look like in practice? Stein (1990) explains: The ACCT (the team) serves as a fixed point of responsibility … and is concerned with all aspects of their (the patients) lives that influence their functioning, including psychological health, physical health, living situation, finances, socialization, vocational activities, and recreational activities. The team sets no time limits for their involvement with patients, is assertive in keeping patients involved. In addition to the day to day work … the team is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
It still doesn’t explain the organized stalking or gangstalking as devil is in details, and every situation is unique. RAND article (archive.org) about involuntary outpatient treatment is vague and lacking any details about the treatment techniques itself.
“This may be the social science equivalent of the Manhattan Project,” says Gary LaFree, the University of Maryland criminologist who will direct the new center of excellence. “Too often, policy-makers have had to counter terrorists on the basis of assumptions and guesstimates. Our job will be to give them more solid information to work with.” The new center of excellence will be built around teams of social scientists drawn from many fields. “It’s an unusual way to do social research, but it fits the challenge,” La Free says. “We know a lot more about violence, group psychology and international conflict than has been brought to bear on this problem. Our teams will be more inclusive so we can tap this expertise.”
It’s a attention grabbing claim to equate new project to potential of nuclear bomb. It could be pompous statement based on nothing, but hot air. It’s not clear if he is talking about this particular center research or social/behavioral terrorism related research in general. Such bold statement warrants further investigation especially if it’s coming from such reputable source (director of Homeland Social and Security Behavioral Research Center). If new weapon promise such huge potential maybe some oversight is warranted or at least explanation what is it that they are doing?
In the first year, one working group will study how terrorist organizations form and recruit, focusing on specific organizations that pose a clear and present danger. One line of research, for example, will ask whether terror groups inspired by religious zeal are more likely to use weapons of mass destruction than their secular counterparts. Another will look at the way terror groups have exploited the 9-11 attacks to expand their base of popular support. Yet another will examine U.S. prisons as recruiting grounds for terror groups.
In all these studies, researchers will look for ways to intervene and disrupt the process. “We’ll be a kind of academic rapid-response team,” LaFree says. “Part of our job will involve getting timely advice to homeland and national security professionals in government.”
A second working group will study the internal dynamics of terror organizations looking for patterns of behavior or other predictors of what groups may do next. A third team will study how to warn of terror risks, prepare for attacks and limit the damage once launched. “The strength of this center lies in the collaboration,” says Gansler. “Through teamwork the assets of each of the partners will be amplified.”
The researchers will draw on a variety of tools including major global databases of ethnic struggles over the past 60 years and the most comprehensive open data set on terror incidents. As part of his prior research, LaFree has been assembling the terror database and will begin to mine it for clues about the roots of terror and effective counter-measures.
The center will also have a strong educational component, helping to train a new generation of researchers in the field of terror-related social science.
CVE: Empirically proven process(es) by which an individual becomes extremist, and capable of violence.
It’s ambitious goal, that seems almost unattainable. Empirical evidence (also empirical data, sense experience, empirical knowledge, or the a posteriori) is a source of knowledge acquired by means of observation or experimentation. It’s not like you can take some volunteers, put them in controlled environment (lab) and apply some external pressure until that person snaps out killing a puppies or bunnies or starts harming himself and call it “radicalization”, unless they have access to federal/private prison system and can use the inmates as their research objects. If you accept shanking as incident of radicalization you have yourself a thesis. Even though data generated would indicate violence, but it wouldn’t reflect or be useful in real life. One way to achieve such empirical evidence would be total population surveillance that would generate enough data to examine history behind some dramatic violent event and create compelling case explaining circumstances that influenced individual’s life leading towards that event (like recent case of Adam Lanza). It doesn’t seem nowhere near feasible or even probable in the near future and it wouldn’t provide information on exact process of radicalization itself. I guess what is possible is partial surveillance of the population that would identify worrying patterns and zeroing onto these individuals for further investigation.
Of course Military has lots of people living under quasi caste system (there is really no need to differentiate between various countries – there is only one military in the world – the rest is military deception), where they are free to do with them pretty much anything. So hazing, sexual assault, suicide, etc incidents should also provide some idea about what is going on. If you look at some stats – they are simply heartbreaking: there is a rape each hour in US military. Thats what gets reported. I assume most of the rapes stay under radar. I wonder what percentage of those rapes are same sex rapes that in reality serves not only as sexual assault, but is used as psychiatric weapon of pervertariat to lobotomize someone. Equality my ass.
Another very suspicious Military program that sounds like Nazi-Gestapo-Kevorkian brainchild is “Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training” (ASIST). They train people to be suicide detection “specialists” that can be part of community and keep that community under surveillance. Imagine some asshole identifies you at suicide risk and unbeknown to you initiates some sort of crazy protocol getting everyone around you to behave in some “special” way towards you. Of course that specialist (or bio sensor) probably keeps tabs on your “suicidal” progress.
Most of the mind control, gangstalking, TI, conspiracy websites point to MKultra data on CIA covert behavioral engineering, but nobody’s talking about human social and cultural behavior modeling (archive.org) field that has been exploding in the past decade with multiple governmental, educational bodies and private companies participating, proposing solutions and methods and bidding for contracts in fighting of global war on terrorism, influencing and shaping of societies, irregular warfare, cultural warfare, etc. If MKultra was a carriage drawn by a horse, HSCB modeling seems to be Lamborghini as focus has not limited to individual, but groups and whole society. NATO has similar program called Virtual Institute on Human Behavior Representation (HBR) (archive.org). I’m having hard time comprehending the purpose of these programs, but in generic terms it seems that modeling and simulation helps you peer into the future as simulation predicts what will happen in the future, how will adversary act or react. It helps to test “what if?” question. In a way behavioral, social and cultural modeling is quasi time machine where modeling and simulation can predict how will individual, group or society will react to some sort of change in their life (stimuli). These are very complex issues that I’m trying to talk about. I could be making complete ass out of myself…
Human behavior modeling (local copy) is the process of developing computable representations of human actions and/or cognition that occur in response to stimuli (both internal and external to the human). Human behavior models require, as a basis, an accurate portrayal of the modeled users’ knowledge and interactions in a process called user modeling. User modeling can be effectively utilized to make explicit the reasoning about the purpose of system adaptations and decisions, to take into account user motivation, and to present a unified model of collaborative, cooperative, and adverse behavior. In addition, employment of a user modeling approach allows the direct incorporation of knowledge derived from cognitive task analysis techniques into the knowledge processing structure of the user model. The main objective of user modeling is to determine what the user intends to do within an environment.
If you look at the picture organized stalking achieves a lot of objectives of radicalization process – augmented self isolation of individual. Of course absolute majority of victims (at least those who went their frustrations on the Internet) will not attack anyone, but some will lash out in some way. Some will harm themselves – suicide is violent act too.
Nobody knows what a hell organized stalking is, but HSCB and HBR programs could be used to model individual life to the second after they become person of interest, including cognitive and emotional domains thus generating behavioral personality patterns and template. If computer simulation plays out some sort of crazy scenario where you’re threat – you will become a target. Just a speculation. Scenario editor would create changes based on that profile and situation.
So capability is there. At least I think it is. So if TI is forced to play chess match against Deep Blue computer where computer knows all his possible moves in advance, the way to defeat it is to break patterns and do things completely out of character. Problem is the template would be updated with new information, so artificial intelligence would start thinking about it too.
Of course it doesn’t mean that every TI is being chased by CIA or DIA. Some of these methods are simply templates and could be copied and applied by copycats or law enforcement as disruptive measures without actual modeling of the situation.
1) Unconflicted adherence (UA) in which the risk information is ignored and the decisionmaker (DM) complacently decides to continue whatever he has been doing.
2) Unconflicted change (UC) to a new course of action, where the DM uncritically adopts whichever new course of action is most salient, obvious, or strongly recommended.
3) Vigilance (VG) in which the DM searches painstakingly for relevant information, assimilates it in an unbiased manner, and appraises alternatives carefully before making a choice.
4) Defensive avoidance (DA) in which the DM evades the conflict by procrastinating, shifting responsibility to someone else, or constructing wishful rationalizations and remaining selectively inattentive to corrective information.
5) Hypervigilance(HY) wherein the DM searches frantically for a way out of the dilemma and impulsively seizes upon a hastily contrived solution that seems to promise immediate relief, overlooking the full range of consequences of his choice because of emotional excitement, repetitive thinking, and cognitive constriction (manifested by reduction in immediate memory Span and simplistic ideas). In its most extreme form, hypervigilance is referred to as “panic.”
All but the third of these coping patterns are regarded by Janis -Mann as “defective.” The first two, while occasionally adaptive in routine or minor decisions, often lead to poor decision-making if a vital choice must be made. Similarly, the last two patterns may occasionally be adaptive but generally reduce the DM’s chances of averting serious loss. The authors note, vigilance, although occasionally maladaptive if danger is imminent and a split-second response is required, generally leads to decisions of the best quality”.
If organized stalking is based on behavior modeling experimentation at least Targets could pat themselves on the back that they are doing great job by providing valuable data helping their countries fighting global war on terror or organized crime. The sad thing is the data from your experiment will probably be used to attack someone just like you only more efficiently.
Another idea to explore is all those hidden camera tv/youtube shows that rely on making people snap and calling it pranking or social experimentation. Some of the earlier shows were Jamie Kennedy Experiment, Punk’d, Boiling Points that were presented as Candid Camera type shows, but with very different approach with very carefully designed, fine tuned and prepared social situations. Nowadays on youtube they have complete psychopaths operating multiple channels designated on “pranking” where they put people into situations that can be considered as assault or a lot worse – inflicting person psychiatric symptoms and if caught red handed – oh we are just joking. They seem to be connected and operating under legal umbrella provided by porn industry (what isn’t these days?) which is of course leads us to sugar daddies in intelligence industry. Don’t forget that some of this “science” is probably used and applied when designing and crafting such foreign NGO programs as StopHam, StopZlob, Hrushi Protiv, Lev Protiv, Федеральный проект “АГЕНТЫ”, Трезвые Дворы, etc. I’m giving examples of programs in Russia as it’s the language I understand and I’ve been following the development of them on youtube for a while now. So here you have it. If you look at it from this perspective Russia is in huge trouble as it’s being destroyed from inside by multiple trojan horses who siphon local budget money for foreign warfare operations. Not to mention experts can review youtube videos and finetune and coordinate actions accordingly by using whatever method is agreed among them. I’m sure in other countries and localities exists similar programs and NGO’s which can appear completely innocent driven by nationalistic pride, fight for human rights, livability, justice or similar psychiatric weaponry, but in reality it’s something else. You have to keep one thing in mind – there are no NGO’s in this world – they all are used as cover for activities that need cover by people that prefer to stay undercover.
I tried to see if a single TI website would link John Boyd OODA Loop to gangstalking or organized stalking. I couldn’t find a single one, even though it’s a apt description of the framework and method of environmental and situational behavioral control with expectation of target confusion to increase until disorder approaches chaos— death. Considering that it’s been for around 40+ years and quite broadly (albeit without original depth of the author) have been used in military, law enforcement and economic domain for various purposes – defense and offense, it’s quite reasonable to examine OODA loop as behavioral model for executing organized stalking. I always struggled to see the reasons why would organized stalking methods be effective or reasonable to employ. Attack on OODA loop (aka control warfare) clearly explains the organized stalking process which is in essence non invasive occupation of individual’s freedom aka mind control, it is also could be employed as theoretical framework for police “disruption tactics”.
Boyd thought that one could “collapse the enemy’s system into confusion and disorder by causing him to over- and under-react to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or misleading.”
The key is to obscure your intentions and make them unpredictable to your opponent while you simultaneously clarify his intentions. That is, operate at a faster tempo to generate rapidly changing conditions that inhibit your opponent from adapting or reacting to those changes and that suppress or destroy his awareness.
What is OODA loop (for observe, orient, decide, and act)?
John Boyd created an enduring legacy for those involved with describing, affecting, and compelling the behavior of others. Encapsulated in his model of the OODA Loop, Boyd’s framework represents the foundation for examining, and affecting, the actions of people, groups, and nations.
For the case of organized stalking we are only concerned about OODA loop in a sense of individual behavior (as they call it type I), unless you’re somehow important in affecting some group, organization or even nation. In that case the target might not be you, but the organization you belong to (suspected, perceived or real). Most of the victims of organized stalking doesn’t appear to be high value targets (HVT), high value individuals (HVI), PONI’s (persons of national interest), etc. So one possible benefactor would be mental health apparatus as they’d draw benefits directly from the state while taking care of targeted individual’s manufactured psychiatric symptoms. Now one has to evaluate cost/benefit ratio. How much does psychiatry industrial complex gets for “caring” for person in and outside the asylum? No matter what – psychiatry benefits directly from gangstalking so they could be considered at least tacit supporter of it.
At the systemic level, the OODA Loop provides a coherent framework for describing human and organizational behavior. People and groups observe what is occurring around them; they fit these observations into a general expectation regarding the environment; they make decisions as necessary or appropriate; and they take action when needed. Externally, it is a very neat and orderly process.
Unfortunately, such a model is also quite vague. Aphorisms like “operate inside the enemy’s decision loop” or “expand the enemy’s decision loop” are expressions of the broad strategic tasks that emerge from this general model. They are rich in metaphor and short on meaning, primarily because they say little about what needs to be done. A closer examination of the entire system reveals the true objective of this approach. The goal of behavioral modification at the systemic level is to reduce the flow of information to the enemy, or to increase the amount of time that it takes the enemy to act on whatever information he possesses. Systemic attacks against an enemy’s OODA Loop strive to isolate the various tasks of observation, orientation, decision, and action from one another. Systemic attack is not about getting inside the enemy’s head. It is about preventing the enemy’s head from getting useful information, and if that fails, preventing the enemy from acting on that information in a timely, relevant manner.
Boyd also uses quantum physics, entropy and the laws of thermodynamics to predict and explain cognitive effects of uncertainty, confusion, incompleteness, suspicion, destruction and creation.
As you can see the purpose is to delay the behavioral loop of the target, where response is needed and at the same time impossible.
Naturally, as we go through life we develop concepts of meaning (with included constituents) to represent observed reality. Can we not liken these concepts—and their related constituents—to the domains and constituents that we have formed in our imagination? Naturally, we can. Keeping this relationship in mind, suppose we shatter the correspondence of each domain or concept with its constituent elements. In other words, we imagine the existence of the parts but pretend that the domains or concepts they were previously associated with do not exist. Result: We have many constituents, or particulars, swimming around in a sea of anarchy. We have uncertainty and disorder in place of meaning and order. Further, we can see that such an unstructuring or destruction of many domains—to break the correspondence of each with its respective constituents—is related to deduction, analysis, and differentiation. We call this kind of unstructuring a destructive deduction.
So targeting somebody’s OODA Loop in essence translates into shifting ones attention and cognitive resources towards a task that is unsolvable with current state of mind. Important element of it is orientation and thats where internet gangstalking sites come in to play. Even though they provide definition, but clearly no solutions whatsoever.
There are a lot more of the theory of OODA Loop in the links you can find below, but the important part is the Boyd’s own suggestion to dealing with such attack:
Fortunately, there is a way out. Remember, as previously shown, we can forge a new concept by applying the destructive deduction and creative induction mental operations. Also, remember, in order to perform these dialectic mental operations we must first shatter the rigid conceptual pattern, or patterns, firmly established in our mind. (This should not be too difficult since the rising confusion and disorder is already helping us to under- mine any patterns). Next, we must find some common qualities, attributes, or operations to link isolated facts, perceptions, ideas, impressions, interactions, observations, etc., together as possible concepts to represent the real world. Finally, we must repeat this unstructuring and restructuring until we develop a concept that begins to match-up with reality. By doing this—in accordance with Godel, Heisenberg and the Second Law of Thermodynamics—we find that the uncertainty and disorder generated by an inward-oriented system to talking to itself can be offset by going outside and creating a new system. Simply stated, uncertainty and related disorder can be diminished by the direct artifice of creating a higher and broader more general concept to represent reality.
However, once again, when we begin to turn inward and use the new concept—within its own pattern of ideas and interactions—to produce a finer grain match with observed reality we note that the new concept and its match-up with observed reality begins to self- destruct just as before. Accordingly, the dialectic cycle of destruction and creation begins to repeat itself once again. In other words, as suggested by Godel’s Proof of Incompleteness, we imply that the process of Structure, Unstructure, Restructure, Unstructure, Re- structure is repeated endlessly in moving to higher and broader levels of elaboration. In this unfolding drama, the alternating cycle of entropy increase toward more and more dis- order and the entropy decrease toward more and more order appears to be one part of a control mechanism that literally seems to drive and regulate this alternating cycle of destruction and creation toward higher and broader levels of elaboration.
So it’s not a solution, but cyclical process of expanding ones cognitive space so attack has no effect on ones goals, intent and freedom.
I’ve been posting various research, essays and academic thesis from government, military, behavioral, social and policing domain. One has to understand that academic papers do not reflect operational reality or reality of the individual in question. Usually it’s just a push from above to describe/influence the existing order/method (one has to keep in mind that every single area of our economy operates under unwritten rule that there are no irreplaceable employees even if they are nobel laureates with IQ of 1000) , but at the same time it provides a glimpse of reality from the “pusher/insider” position. Almost all targeted individuals share the notion that only government could organize and execute such operations, but at the same time it’s almost impossible to understand why would these individuals pose a threat to the state. So analyzing government/military intellectuals defining the threat, reality, methods could at least give some indirect insight into bigger picture why is it reasonable for them to attack seemingly random people. Argument could be made that defense and policing apparatus became so paranoid/disoriented that they started attacking their own people that they are supposed to be protecting. Another argument could be made that it’s no mistake and state has some very logical/strategic reasons like research, exercise or training on people that they consider disposable for whatever reason anyways. One can only use the information for analytical purposes when overlaying it over your existing perception of reality.
There are few very important paragraphs in this article titled “The Specter of Non-Obvious Warfare” by Martin C. Libicki. It shows that even states have serious problems dealing with attack that they do not understand where it came from or by who and for what reason. Some solutions.
Ambiguity is the heart of non-obviousness. If the victim is unsure of who carried out an operation, it may hesitate to respond in the same way as if it were certain. Alternatively, the rest of the world might have doubts even if the victim is certain, leaving the victim wary of responding as it might have if others were very sure of matters.
Non-obviousness is enhanced if the events in question can themselves be questioned. Nevertheless, some non-obvious warfare incidents would clearly be acts of war if they were obvious—in which case, the key ambiguity is the actor not the act. Some forms of warfare are non-obvious because the relationship between the attacker and a state is unclear;
Exactly how the target state acquires the confidence that another specific state carried out an attack will also vary, but one cannot go very far wrong by considering means, motives, and opportunity. Opportunity—in the form of some traceable delivery vehicle—often best distinguishes obvious from non-obvious warfare.
So what can be done with non-obvious warfare? One use is general coercion or dissuasion. Instead of signaling, “if you do this we will do that,” the signal is, “if you do this then bad things will happen to you.” Because the act of signaling itself may implicate the attacker, it helps if the signals come from someone else.
The advantages of starting in a non-obvious mode are twofold. First, if the initial attack were obvious the target might counter move in ways that would make the attack harder to pull off. It may know where to point its defenses, so to speak; it could rally others to pressure the attacker; or it could even counterattack. Second, if the attack falls short of its objectives, the attacker may cancel the overt attack and remain obscure in hopes of eluding punishment. Correspondingly, a non-obvious attack may be a test to see if the particular technique works, what the target’s defenses are, and where improvements should be sought. It would be an expensive test if the target itself should learn something about its vulnerabilities and thereby have cause to work them and evidence on how to do so.
Non-obvious warfare can also be carried out for narrative effect. Normally, in warfare the attacker and the target are both part of the narrative, and unless the attacker’s actions are totally baseless, the contest over narratives is likely to be two-handed with each side’s fans supporting their own side. However, if the attacker is unknown, or at least unclear, then the focus of the story is necessarily on the target, and the theme is likely to focus on why the target was attacked—and may well dwell on what the target did that merited the attack or why the target could not secure itself. That, in fact, may be the attacker’s motive: to create a crisis of confidence in the target state, either weakening it outright, creating fissures in its body politic, or at least making it more amenable to concession. Finally, if an attacker can persuade the target that it was hit by a third party, it may catalyze conflict that will be to the attacker’s advantage.
Mostly, though, targets would simply want such attacks to stop—but how? Defense is clearly an option and one that would logically assume greater importance the less it can lean on not hitting back because it is unsure about who committed the offense. Another option is to help create pressure from the world community to end the possession of the requisite attack technology, but most of these cannot be effectively banned. The weapons of sabotage, special operations, and insurgencies are small arms. More broadly, it is how such weapons are used rather than the weapons themselves that determines the characteristics of non-obvious warfare. A variant on the second approach is to develop a global consensus that the covert use of warfare is far more heinous than its overt use. Thus, if such weapons are used—something that may not always be apparent— the world community would support efforts to pressure potential users into allowing investigations that would clarify which state was at fault. After all, most forms of warfare are universally held to be crimes if carried out by those outside the military; thus, even the accused state should have an interest in finding and rooting out its dangerous criminals, assuming it would wish to shift the blame. Where states use proxies and such acts are crimes, they may be pressured to cooperate with international police in investigations. Satisfaction for the aggrieved party, however, assumes police actions can establish reasonable levels of certainty. More problematically, the closer the trail of investigation comes to the doors of military or intelligence establishments, the greater the reluctance of states to allow matters to proceed. Such reluctance would not be unfounded—if purported acts of non-obvious warfare allow investigators to peer into covert operations, states may go to great lengths to interpret the need for evidence in ways that would also allow them to uncover the secrets of their rivals. The last recourse is for victimized states and their allies to respond to suspected warring states as if certain they did it. In doing so, they must factor in how certain others are that the accusation is correct and, to some extent, whether the purported attacking state believes it is guilty. Many non-obvious warfare techniques can be carried out by rogue elements. As noted, some responses, such as chilling relations between the target and the purported attacker, do not require anything close to conclusive proof; mere uneasiness suffices. Other responses, such as retaliation, normally require high levels of confidence. In the end, the victimized state has to weigh the risks associated with false negatives (doing nothing in the face of aggression) and false positives (retaliating against the innocent). Note further that “plausible deniability” is hardly an absolute in this case.
Would the spread of non-obvious warfare be a good thing? Even if wielded solely in pursuit of good aims, such techniques corrode both military values and diplomatic norms. Non-obvious warfare, almost by definition, has to be the work of small teams that must isolate themselves from the larger community, much like intelligence operatives, lest word of their adventures leak out. The efforts of the small non-obvious warfare teams would leave the mass of the national security establishment quite uncertain about what exactly was going on and who exactly was behind all the activity (only some of which would appear to be accidental). Non-obvious warfare is also a poor fit for democratic states and a far better fit for authoritarian or failing states in which the intelligence community has become decoupled from its legitimate governance structure. States with long-term reputations to manage are likely to see the downside from having to lie about their warfare activities when so confronted.
I was reading another targeted individual’s account and it got me thinking about community as another element of organized stalking/gangstalking, but I couldn’t really identify it as unifying factor for every TI – as abuse continues even after TI moves to new place, another country, even continent. One has to keep in mind that TI might be anchored/conditioned to some common stimuli and without deprogramming it doesn’t matter where he moves as torture becomes internal.
Community is very important aspect of “organized stalking”, but looking at it from a distance it’s not the community, but synthetic albeit informal aspect of this crime what makes it so hard for TI to pierce the veil the bubble of isolation. Community itself can’t be at fault as responsibility is diffused, but emerging organizational structure of community that is almost by design can be exploited to invert position on one of their members by attaching stigma to targeted individual to gain necessary level of legitimacy for systematic abuse. It is also strange that not a single instance of “organized stalking” got revealed by so called “perps” or witnesses, who are supposedly operating around TI’s in the throves. Especially having in mind all the modern communication, social media, safe community policing initiatives, etc. One can say that it’s expected as with mobbing or bullying, since the fact of revelation wouldn’t be self-beneficial, but altruistic if revealer of conspiracy understands the conspiracy. So for conspiracy to be revealed for the benefit towards TI by casual observer in the community:
observer has to be certain of conspiracy
It is altruistic – as observer understands the unethical effects it’s supposed to have on TI and community at large, so helping TI would be about “fixing something broken in the system”
There are limits on how far one can influence another’s ideas and actions. Attempts to assert total control are likely to be met with ingenuity to circumvent it towards freedom. People tend to rely on their own, those who share a common identity, for they most closely share values and interests. If community is a part of a system where TI or number of TI’s can be seen as outsiders by some sort of criteria and “organized stalking” is just one of the augmented mechanisms for the system to deal with targets by informal repression – it means system isn’t broken. It works like a clock. One can look at it as incapacitation as alternative to incarceration, where augmentation of existing fears and neurosis (that to some degree exists in everyone, except psychopaths) to the level requiring psychiatric attention. Whatever it really is – it is form of eugenics and modern day community can almost be perceived having cult characteristics where members aren’t even aware of top-down manipulation.
Co-operative punishment together with pro-social behavior produces a self reinforcing system that allows the emergence of a ‘Darwinian Leviathan’ that strengthens social institutions.
Pro-social behavior is not ethical or non-ethical – according to research it simply means “behavior that favors the group”. Subjects of punishment are called freeriders. It’s hard to tell what they mean by that, but I guess ones that exhibit behavior that doesn’t favor the group. They even seriously discuss mobbing as one of the forms of cooperative punishment towards a goal of promoting pro-social behavior.
The core of the problem, we believe, is the assumption that the punishment required to enforce pro-social altruism has to be applied individually-without possibly coordinating efforts with other group members-as in a prisoners’ dilemma situation. We fail to see why members of a social group could not apply punishment co-operatively-instead of individually-which would enable them to distribute the costs of punishment evenly among all group members. And if such costs can, in fact, be distributed among group members, the cost to each individual is minimized and the theoretical problem of the understanding the evolutionary dynamics of pro-social behavior may actually be solved (Zaballa 2006). Co-operative punishment is a fundamental part of human society -as exemplified by human bands, Indian tribes, slum mobsters, the police, law enforcement, taxation and most modern social institutions- and might occur in other animal societies although we could not find any published evidence for this. Another route to co-operative punishment is mobbing. Although as described originally it is aimed at predators, it is used to harass co-operatively something that represents a threat to them, mobbing against conspecifics would classify as co-operative punishment. Unfortunately experimental evidence for behaviors like mobbing or other cooperative strategies to punish intra-specific free-riders among animal societies is very scarce or totally absent.
So they have formulas and ran simulations with three different types of societies – no collective punishment, altruistic punishment and cooperative punishment. The key conclusions:
Co-operative punishment may reduce the costs of punishment as a consequence of the synergy that typically results from co-operation. For example, when various individuals punish someone co-operatively, resistance may be expected to fall dramatically reducing the cost for punishing and thus increasing the ratio: cost to punished / cost to punisher
Co-operative punishment may increase the effectiveness of punishment as a result of the combined capacities of many society members in monitoring individual behavior, making it possible to detect infractions in a way that freelance punishers could never match.
Social enforcement of rules is less subject to forces affecting the individual, such as a lack of immediacy, or immediately available resources for punishment, etc., and thus more efficient by itself, irrespective of all advantages cited above
Co-operative punishment may involve additional costs in terms of observations, evaluations, and discussions required to reach an agreement. In constituted societies punishment costs may actually lie for the most part in these necessary proceedings rather than in the execution of punishment itself, thus reinforcing its power to exert a consistent selective pressure leading to the evolution of pro-social behaviors.
In any case, humans enforce pro social structures by co-operative punishment following the same basic pattern as mob-beatings, for society members carefully avoid assuming the costs of punishment individually, but press for public resolutions that divide the costs of punishment among all society members. One way to achieve this is reputation through moral gossip, by which individuals make public their private knowledge of other people’s antisocial behavior until there is a consensus to apply some form of punishment. If after a series of antisocial acts people agree, for instance, that the offender should be ostracized-a common punishment in band societies that in practice may amount to death penalty-the costs of such punishment, which consist mainly of loosing the co-operative capacities of the offender, are practically nil. This kind of cooperation might be especially important in keeping religious groups together . Another way to socialize the costs of punishment is to appoint punishers (police among humans; individuals specialized in tackling social corruption among social insects and compensate them with public resources-the common pile of food in our modeled society-so that the costs of punishment are ultimately borne by all society members, whether they actually participate in punishment or not.
This research is purely theoretical, but sort of scary to think about it as foundation for pro-social society where cooperation is enforced by mob rule. Social scientists have a lot of intriguing games: dictator game, ultimatum game, prisoner’s dilemma game, trust game, cooperation game, social trap, public choice, etc
So maybe it’s incorrect to look at organized stalking from TI’s position alone as it is probably modeled with community in mind. It might also be helpful for TI to distinguish real perps from average community member who is only cooperating without realizing the bigger picture.
Another quote from research into Social Norms. Website gondapeter.sk/files/social_norms_presen_gnd.pdf disabled no pdf archive available. There is archive of his diploma. It seems it’s just quotes taken from other works – this and this:
Large percentage of subjects are willing to enforce distribution and cooperation norms even though they incur costs and reap no economic benefit from their sanctions and even though they have not been directly harmed by the norm violation.
Research shows that punishment is a human universal. “We used two behavioral experiments, the ultimatum and third party punishment games, among 1762 adults sampled from 15 diverse populations from five continents, representing the breadth of human production systems.” “All populations demonstrate some willingness to administer costly punishment as unequal behavior increases”
So here you have it. Social research explains how organized stalking, harassment and disruption tactics can be tolerated and even supported by community at large as long as it’s defined as punishment for behavior that is detrimental to the group. Thoughts?
“Personality based targeting” has certain ring to it making targeted individual to pause and pay attention, even though it’s a part of big counterinsurgency military targeting doctrine that includes lethal and non-lethal options. There is little information about personality based targeting on Google – less than 100 hits if you discount unrelated information. Some of the hits are on resumes and intelligence analyst hiring sites requiring top secret clearances. Military sometimes uses shortened version “personality targeting” – it has more hits, but less than 10 on .mil domains. The F3EAD (Find-Fix-Finish-Exploit-Analyze-Disseminate) model was developed for personality-based targeting (local copy) and has been widely adopted as the principal targeting process for AtN (attack the network) targeting HVI (high value individuals). A high-value individual is a person of interest (friendly, adversary, or enemy) who must be identified, surveilled, tracked and influenced through the use of information or fires. A lot more information is available on F3EAD model as it’s not used only for personality based targeting, but regular counterinsurgency. So personality based targeting and F3EAD are not interchangeable. Also lets not dazzle ourselves with “high value” labels as changes in technology over the years changed a lot of things – if 20 years ago cell phone was affordable only to selected few, now every chav carries one.
Targeting networks include not only addressing threat capabilities, but also creating conditions for success among the population as a whole. Because networks exist and operate among the general population, target engagement requires a much greater level of precision to be successful. Conventional forces need to target individuals and populations in much the same manner as SOF have in the past. This approach is called personality targeting; other targeting concepts, such as time-sensitive targeting and high-value targets/individuals are related to this subject.
The intent of personality-based targeting is not always only kill/capture. Instead, this method focuses on identifying the individual as well as the population, determines his role within a network, and then seeks to influence him through all means available to the MAGTF.
Personality targeting increases the detail and amount of intelligence that must be produced in pursuit of a target. Managing this information requires categorizing targets in a standardized way so that actions on a given target can be synchronized across the echelons of command. The level of precise information required to operate effectively at attacking a network requires organizing the information in useable chunks. An effective method is to characterize personality targets by their functions in the network, the relative importance of those functions, and the target’s accessibility. Personality targeting reduces the opposition to its smallest form—the individual. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations – file removed no archived copy available. File was hosted on USMC small wars center for irregular warfare server. I guess Orwell works in mysterious ways. There are two other files that got archived: Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare (local copy) and District Stability Framework (local copy).
The exploit and analyze steps are often the “main effort” of F3EAD because they provide insight into the threat’s network and may offer new lines of operations. The information collected during the exploit and analyze steps restarts the cycle by providing leads to an observable and traceable network. (intelligence officer handbook (local copy))
Anyways I have very little understanding of military science and one also have to keep in mind the possible differences of theory and practice. The reason it’s interesting to explore these theories is because occupying army is not only fighting war on terror, but they are responsible for nation building as well, so they use all these strategies to fight (organized) crime, keep population stable and shape society by various means like irregular warfare, culture warfare, information operations, psyops, etc. We live in the times of global war on terror and war on drugs and organized crime so it’s not far fetch to assume that analogous softer mechanisms might exists in western world eg fusion centers, etc.. Knowing far reaching anti-terror laws are in western world and widespread abuse of them one can only wonder as to what we know and what we don’t know.
What caught my attention was a thread on gamers forum that mentioned “personality based targeting” (archive.og). Thread author (OP) sort of makes fun of another intelligence analyst’s resume. The picture above about military intelligence is actually from one of his posts signatures. He is intimately aware with the term and sort of brags about it. He wouldn’t have posted it if he didn’t know that at least some of the members would understand what is he trying to say. Some members were dumbfounded so it’s a mixed bag forum and apparently some intelligence analysts do like playing computer games – they are young people:
lol hipster line in resume:
golson3 | Posted on Feb. 1, 2012, 4:11 p.m. “While assigned to 2-136 IN BN at Camp Taqaddum, Iraq, created a streamlined personality based targeting process resulting in the development, capture, prosecution, and conviction of 15 high value targets, before warrant based targeting was standard procedure.”
Blackjack946 | Posted on Feb. 1, 2012, 5:10 p.m. So what are you trying to say? Are you saying that the military based its intelligence program off your design or it was just simply a coincidence and you were doing this before the military was?
If its the latter, don’t worry about including it on your resume. It won’t make a difference. That’s something to mention in an interview instead.
golson3 | Posted on Feb. 1, 2012, 5:12 p.m. Not really a coincidence. I just realized that this was a better course of action in the long term before the rest of the community caught on to it. Taking dirtbags off of the battlefield (semi) permanently instead of just detaining them with no evidence and letting them be released 4-5 months down the road, right back into the fight, and with many new connections and knowledge gained during their incarceration. Maybe it is best left for an interview, but I gotta put something in the “selected achievements” area. Oddly, the ones I have from normal day to day operations in the US are much more impressive.Think I might add how I kept them locked up as well. I even blocked one guy from getting out 5 months after I left Iraq. Little bastard spit in my face, so I was kind of personally invested in it.
One can only speculate what kind of methods are used to take “dirtbags off battlefield (semi) permanently”, but he also mentions about day to day operations in US. It’s hard to say what he meant – if it’s about him being on US soil and working on Iraq intelligence or working on US targets. But for analyst his own location isn’t important – target’s location is the key. It is candid conversation that can easily represent something completely different.
In another thread (archive.org) he shares funny labels for targets. He is not naming operations as they are classified, but target label apparently isn’t:
golson3 | Posted on Nov. 29, 2011, 5:20 a.m. Just got “Objective Stanky Leg” approved. The commander is not amused, but its too late, as its been approved by higher.
golson3 | Posted on Nov. 29, 2011, 7:01 a.m. Neptune Spear is a reference to the SEALs. Naval Special Warfare’s emblem has an eagle on an anchor holding a pistol and a trident.
Also, I’m not naming operations. Objectives in this sense are personality based. Because the bad guys use so many different aliases, and many of them use the same name, its become standard practice to give them an objective name. Names have to be kind of out there these days, as we’ve been at this for 10 years and we’re not supposed to use the same one twice.
golson3 | Posted on Nov. 29, 2011, 7:19 a.m. On deck:OBJ Chicken Noodle Soup
OBJ Harlem Shake
OBJ Laffy Taffy
OBJ Cupid Shuffle
OBJ Crank Dat
OBJ Lean Wit It
OBJ Rock Wit It
OBJ Walk It Out
Also:OBJ Put a Ring on It
OBJ Movin Like Bernie
OBJ Cha Cha Slide
OBJ Tootsee Roll
OBJ Cabbage Patch
OBJ Humpty Hump
Professional Troll | Posted on Nov. 30, 2011, 1:41 a.m. BalisticWarri0r posted…These must be pointless objectives. No commander wants to sign off on a high profile objective name that is stupid. Especially if said objective is being monitored by brigade or division level.Code names are used specifically so that they can be mentioned without fear of revealing TS/SCI information.
golson3 | Posted on Nov. 30, 2011, 6:43 a.m.
Or any classified information, really.
In the thread about clandestinely fighting splinter terrorist groups (archive.org) he gives this cryptic message – not clear if he is talking about his targets or war on terror itself:
When you pick crappy friends and don’t think about 2nd and 3rd order effects of your actions, you kind of dig yourself into a hole, and climbing out of that hole is expensive.
Again it’s hard to describe the process or goal of intelligence analyst preparing Powerpoint slides on targets (his job) and if it’s in any case related to targeted individuals at large. He is just a little, but important bolt that is part of this big mechanism. But it’s interesting to look at F3EAD cycle with nonlethal effects and see how it applies to TI’s as it suffers from few flaws that can apparently result in targeting for the sake of targeting (local copy). There are also voices that promote using F3EAD as process in law enforcement: 1 – dead link since National Policing Improvement Agency has been dismantled and absorbed into other departments. There are 186 other scary documents archived: https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/* . If you look at missing persons intelligence officer job “competencies” you have to be in some sort of parallel universe not to think that UK police resembles psych-wards something along the lines “one flew over cuckoo’s nest”.
So I downloaded and watched this Jesse Ventura show called “conspiracy theory” about Targeted Individuals (Brain Invaders S03E07). You can watch it here: https://vimeo.com/56215921 or on youtube, bittorent, etc… I know TI’s will be rejoiced that at least someone on TV is talking about it, but as far as I can see the show didn’t crack any eggs, unless you consider that slime on Ventura’s face as an egg.
The show didn’t even touch organized stalking and harassment issue. Targeted individual problem was framed mainly about hearing voices through microwaves, radio frequency or some other high tech means. I’m not saying that such narrow definition is deliberate misdirection, but it right away discredits large portion of TI’s as “not fitting in” this frame.
So approach was mapping all the targeted individuals on the map (where did they get these statistics?), subsequently clusters appeared in specific areas and it gave them some sort of clue about GWEN towers – cold war relic communication system. This approach doesn’t really make sense as it would imply that people are targeted based on location of residence.
They interviewed some ex CIA guy. Interview is a strong word – Jesse was doing most of the talking. Another black ops guy in a white wan was interviewed by Jesse’s team member, who also didn’t say anything of substance except saying don’t look at the present – look at the past. Finally ex-CIA scientist “star witness” (Robert Duncan) who claims to have invented the system, but couldn’t really give any details or evidence. He also speculatively assumed that GWEN towers have capability, he didn’t confirm that it’s the towers that are behind this. None of these witnesses confirmed that they work for government – from OSI it appears they been out of government work for years if not decades. So show pretty much made an impression that:
1. Targeted individuals are ones who hear voices in their head through rf/microwaves
2. The reason for this is criticism of government
3. There are a few bad apples in the government who are behind this at the same time it’s systematic and mainstream (self contradictory)
4. There is nothing that could be done
You have to understand that main purpose of the show is to make it interesting for the wide audience. The show didn’t uncover anything new what’s already out there. It only rehashed some points, made some assumptions, quickly jumped to conclusions, got a few TI’s, dubious field experiment, flashy graphics and a lot of undeserved patting on their own back – typical low budget military psyop. I speculate that black budgets are misused and mishandled in cases like this and money laundering becomes the issue. Jesse Ventura didn’t do any favors to TI’s with this fear mongering, agenda driven show. He didn’t use his own government or military connections to bring at least an ounce of credibility into the issue. If you want to create effect – how about using some Michael Moore style confrontational tactics on these “bad apples” in dark crevices of the government? Even Borat was able to gain access to some very high members of the government.
Maybe Jesse Ventura will take on organized stalking as separate topic to investigate? Hopefully…
These are discussions in EU parliament that describe issues of profiling predicting a possibility of innocent people being put under microscope of repressive measures. It’s not so much about terrorism, muslims or islam – it’s about a crime too, where having enough boxes marked next to a person’s profile will mark you as person of interest and possible affects it might have on that person; not to mention the motivation of secret services of “creating appearance” of a threat by manufacturing cases, to justify huge monetary and humanitarian resources allocated to fight undefinable terrorism, dangers of radicalism, organized crime, drugs, etc. If those in power do not know what are they looking for except the constant cult like babbling about how a threat exists – it’s surely will cause weird analytical misnomers. Problem is not about making mistakes, problem is about the reasons of why mistakes are not viewed as the source of possible learning experience, instead the denying any wrongdoing seems priority.
Sarah Ludford, rapporteur. (archive.org)− Madam President, over the past decade, laws and practices have been introduced enabling the retention and exchange of huge volumes of personal data. Currently the EU itself is proposing a number of measures that facilitate profiling, a technique of pulling together data from various sources in order to make a sort of template against which are identified those people whose characteristics, behaviour or associates seem suspicious and who merit further screening as likely perpetrators of crime or terrorism. There has also been a move in policing towards a predictive and preventive approach which, while not without value in some circumstances, can lead to repressive measures against innocent people based on stereotyping, often on the basis of race or even religion. The reason I am concerned about profiling and data-mining is because they depart from the general rule that law-enforcement decisions should be based on an individual’s personal conduct. The danger exists that an innocent person may be subject to arbitrary stops, interrogations or travel disruption. Then, if that flagging of them as a person of interest is not promptly removed, longer-term restrictions could follow, such as refusal of visas and entry, bans on employment or even arrest and detention.
N. Whereas ‘predictive profiling’ (archive.org), using broad profiles developed through cross-referencing between databases and reflecting untested generalisations or patterns of behaviour judged likely to indicate the commission of some future or as-yet-undiscovered crime or terrorist act raises strong privacy concerns and may constitute an interference with the rights to respect for private life under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter(29);
P. Whereas the ECtHR’s above-mentioned finding in S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, of a ‘risk of stigmatisation’ from the fact that persons not convicted of any offence are treated in the same way as convicted criminals in the UK DNA database must also raise questions about the legality of profiling operations based on processing of personal data of persons not found guilty by the courts(31);
T. Whereas the inverse problem is the possibility of missing perpetrators who do not fit the profile, an example being the ringleader of the 7 July 2005 London bombings who “had come to the attention of the intelligence services as an associate of other men who were suspected of involvement in a terrorist bomb plot…but …was not pursued because he did not tick enough of the boxes in the pre-July 2005 profile of the terror suspect”(34);
While reading into NATO behavior and social research I came upon mentioning of a “wicked problem“. While it sounds a lot like double bind, it’s a little more generalized as it’s not oriented towards a person. Just like double bind it accurately describes the situation that TI is experiencing.
There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem (defining wicked problems is itself a wicked problem).
Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but better or worse.
There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.
Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; because there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, every attempt counts significantly.
Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.
Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.
The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem’s resolution.
The planner has no right to be wrong (planners are liable for the consequences of the actions they generate).
Conklin later generalized the concept of problem wickedness to areas other than planning and policy. The defining characteristics are:
The problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution.
Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong.
Every wicked problem is essentially novel and unique.
Every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one shot operation.’
Wicked problems have no given alternative solutions.
As you see it’s quite accurate description of the problem. You can read about possible solution scenarios on wikipedia, but I’m not sure if it’s helpful. Nato psychologist notes that wicked problems are typically solved (as well as they can be) through group efforts. According to them psychological support to military is a wicked problem.
Wicked problem environment…
Problem space is ill-structured
No “right” solution, only “good enough”
Problem-solving ends only when you run out of resources
Unique/novel set of conditions and factors
No second opportunities to do it again
No obvious alternative solution
look at the animated gifs above that display animals in situations where they appear having “problems”. Those problems are very tough to solve on their own. It’s a cause of major distress, where your own freedom is used to enslave you in multi-layered trap. Lets assume artificial intelligence folks (deep mind, Palantir Technologies, etc) gains enough power to look after people, surveillance logs, video security, behavioral health, community health, etc. How do you think AI would classify a person who has happened to be trapped in situation like this? Absolute majority of the humans don’t really understand what is their purpose on this planet Earth so everyone right away is a solid candidate for this cornerstone symptom of schizophrenia or as we should start looking at psychiatry and medical establishment as assassination weapon in hands of those who have power. Any social support institution (which is definition of the government in the civilized world) for that matter should be looked at as such. Power is no longer in the hands. It’s diffused. What is even more troubling that in this day n age there was major shift to move that power to so called NGO’s (there is no such thing – it’s just cover), faith based groups (it’s just cover), charities/foundations/institutes/think tanks/etc (just cover for the worst scum of the worst) and private sector (which right away ceases to be private sector). So task of following money and paper trail gets even more complicated (think of the kitty with santa hat that has objective to catch a mouse that is trapped in the bottle). The problem is that most likely AI is already doing such things and is probably being used in very evil eugenic fashion – eg look at this company business description from the year 1998: if you use double speak translator it sounds as death squad for hire 123 . Every tool can be used for good and evil – any sharp object eg knife can be used to cut the ropes and free someone, at the same time it can be used to slaughter someone. This new startup doesn’t hold any punches – they are covertly monitoring population and employing proactive solutions with personalized approaches.
What if such recently revealed high tech advancements in real time video augmentation capabilities like face2face are in fact weapons of cyberwarfare, classified computer viruses. Imagine hostile power hijacking your video, skype, livechat, internet feeds and outdoor sensors that track you and mess with your likeness making you appear insane to the automated or human analyzing party thus marking you for elimination or separation from the “healthy” herd. Simplest case scenario – imagine talking on the skype with your relative and someone hijacks your feed and face and starts making subtle, but noticeable grimaces, blinking, smirking, twitching, etc. Your relative will start noticing something and start treating you as if you’re “different”, leaving you dumbfounded what a hell is going on. Think about explosion of that cybersex trade and so called “camwhores”. With real time video augmentation technology you will never know who is doing what, not to mention that all that sex trade is not really a business or profession, but a weapon.
New crime policing strategies in law enforcement domain are geared towards lowering crime rates and at the same time making communities more “livable”. This study (archive.org) exposes unethical methods that police use to cook books in order to create favorable statistics. Problem with crime control in general is the overall measurement of performance as motivational force. We have to discount high profile cases that shape public opinion of police where police are forced to put all their resources and focus on day to day work. “Observations had identified four distinct categories of perverse behaviours designed to improve performance by unethical means, or give the false impression performance had improved. Such behaviours are referred to colloquially as “fiddling the figures”, “cooking the books” or “good housekeeping”.
In the academic literature they are referred to as “gaming” behaviour and there is a body of theory on the subject”. One has to wonder and question if new policing methods truly lower crime or they just create better circumstances for crime rates to appear lower?
The report calls this unethical behavior as “gaming”:
The four categories of “gaming” behaviours identified are defined as follows:
Cuffing: The under-recording of reported crimes, the term being derived from the magician’s art of making objects disappear up the sleeve or cuff.
Nodding: This involves collusion between officers and suspects to admit to large numbers of offences, usually whilst in prison after sentence, in return for favours such as reduced sentences, access to partners, drugs or alcohol. The term is used to describe the act of a prisoner pointing out or “nodding” at locations where they claim to have committed offences.
Skewing: This involves moving resources from areas of activity which are not subject to performance measures in order to improve performance in areas that are monitored for control purposes
Stitching: This includes a variety of malpractices designed to enhance the strength of the evidence against a suspect in order to ensure the desired criminal justice outcome. Fabricating evidence or stitching someone up are forms of this behaviour.
Of course gaming is not related to organized stalking directly, but you have to keep in mind the numbness of institutional authority as to what is going on in their backyard. It’s hard to imagine that they are unaware of it with all the surveillance and intelligence. You have to give props to UK for at least being transparent with FOIA.
I think it’s important for TI or anyone for that matter to get acquainted and understand the modern policing and how it defines its own role in society. Remember the saying “if you’ve done nothing wrong you have nothing to worry about”? The premise of that saying is that police will only react to the crime or criminal behavior. Modern day policing is different animal all together where the emphasis is placed on society as a whole having to self-police through self-governing informal and formal social norms, implied and learned behavior and police have tools resembling invisible strings to influence communities through various newly baked doctrines (at least thats what they think). Community is treated as a unit, who’s needs and problems can be addressed through multi agency cooperation, monitoring and intervention. Implied assumption is that community knows whats best for it. I guess this model would work if everyone participated in the closed knit community as in primitive democracy aka one household so information flow is distributed evenly and openly to everyone (at least in theory). Now this model lowered from above and it’s implementation is not self-organizing, the structure is not self-serving and it does not really represent a community, but something community as a whole doesn’t even know exist. Communities exist only on paper, only as units of appearance. Is it a form of control by hidden hand where benefits outweigh possible quirks and abuses? It looks like a shift from individualism that free society is supposed to value, defend and respect towards something free society isn’t. Maybe issues raised by anti-communitarian activists are worth looking into?
Community policing is a value system which permeates a police department, in which the primary organizational goal is working cooperatively with individual citizens, groups of citizens, and both public and private organizations to identify and resolve issues which potentially effect the livability of specific neighborhoods, areas, or the city as a whole. Community-based police departments recognize the fact that the police cannot effectively deal with such issues alone, and must partner with others who share a mutual responsibility for resolving problems. Community policing stresses prevention, early identification, and timely intervention to deal with issues before they become unwieldy problems. Individual officers tend to function as general-purpose practitioners who bring together both government and private resources to achieve results. Officers are encouraged to spend considerable time and effort in developing and maintaining personal relationships with citizens, businesses, schools, and community organizations.
Rather than merely responding to demands for police services, the department employees a Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) approach: identifying emergent problems, gathering data, bringing together stakeholders, and implementing specific strategies targeting the problem. The police response to an on-going or repetitive problem seldom involves only police resources. The police are concerned not only with high-visibility crimes, but with minor offenses which contribute to fear of crime, and negatively effect public perception of city or neighborhood safety
Problem-oriented policing (POP) is a policing strategy that involves the identification and analysis of specific crime and disorder problems, in order to develop effective response strategies in conjunction with ongoing assessment. This strategy places more emphasis on research and analysis as well as crime prevention and the engagement of public and private organizations in the reduction of community problems.
Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is a policing model that has emerged in recent years which is “built around risk assessment and risk management.”ILP is “a strategic, future-oriented and targeted approach to crime control, focusing upon the identification, analysis and ‘management’ of persisting and developing ‘problems’ or ‘risks.’” In simpler terms, “it is a model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse.
Community policing serves also as a source of third party policing and intelligence policing. It’s strange how many definitions and arguments exists in criminology literature of these strategies and disciplines knowing how widely are they implemented. It just shows that interpretation and evolution is ongoing just as society is catching up to them. One thing is clear – these strategies do not help to solve the crime – the idea is for them to help to prevent and reduce crime. Maybe it’s because of realization that punishment for the crime isn’t effective measure – it’s expensive and changes little apart of isolation of the criminal. Each of new policing strategy implementation and transition is gradual and doesn’t show the whole picture. Modern and old methods coexists hand in hand. Now police gets involved not in solving crimes, but in solving problems. So what if you haven’t committed a crime and unexplained authority is paying attention to you? Who defined you as a problem? Is it a rumor? Or rumor is a pretext? If you have no or little reputation (like someone who just moved into the area) you can be on extremely shaky ground and very vulnerable.
The shift from evidence based towards intelligence based policing also fits into bigger picture of global war on terror where assumption is that intelligence is the key in preventing incidents of terrorism. Where am i going with this? The recent highly controversial and very expensive DOD program called Human Terrain Systems that is being widely employed in war theater in the Afghanistan and Iraq. The name itself is something causing a pause as if people are something to be walked over. Controversy is basically coming only from progressive anthropologists themselves as they argue that “asking an anthropologist to gather intelligence that may lead to someone’s death or imprisonment […] is like asking an army doctor to kill a wounded insurgent”; it goes against their code of ethics and is wrong in many different levels. Why I’m making connection with community policing or policing in general? Not me:
Although the past shows incidents of the abuse of this information (local copy), the current human terrain system has been used effectively to allow communities in Iraq and Afghanistan to self govern through informal forms of social control, while teaching organic law enforcement agencies to provide the more formal forms of social control (when needed). This environment is similar to the development of the community policing model in the United States. Community-oriented policing is not a new phenomenon in the history of policing; however it, too, has had a questionable history at times, which has led to the current form of intelligence-led, problem-solving policing.
Basically what they argue that occupied culture already has informal community policing models in place that is just different than of ours. So we need an interpreting/analytical tools to understand these mechanism in order to influence and exploit them for everyones (occupiers and occupied) good.
Information on social groups and their interests, beliefs, and leaders, and what drives a group of people to adhere to a commonly held set of rules for conduct is a core necessity for maintaining social order in both a domestic law enforcement setting and on the foreign battle field through human terrain systems. The social order of a community is maintained largely through the influence and enforcement of informal social controls which can be supported by the presence of agents that support both governmental and non-governmental partners within the community
Successful implementation of the community-oriented policing would have involved the citizenry in identifying problems and allowed for an open relationship with law enforcement where these problems could be addressed”. Most glaring was the assumption of many agencies that they could adopt the mantle of community-oriented policing without tackling the most important aspects of the movement; fully engaging the community in the co-production of public safety.
So in essence it’s all about compliance and effective mechanisms to enforce it under guise of self-governance. Another sentence that could be applied to organized stalking: “community-oriented policing does not take into account the development of the community into self governance, which comes as a result of the individuals within the community taking responsibility for controlling those that deviate from the social norm”. It doesn’t mean that TI’s are targeted because they are deviant from social norms (although it might be – idea of normalcy is pretty much oxymoron term). This quote just points to informal social control mechanisms that exists without us even noticing them as we have learned to fear and respect them, but how do you exploit them? Is it possible to amplify them towards a targeted person by using existing dynamic environment? Hard to say. But looking at screen shots of software used to generate and analyze “human terrain” in Afghanistan/Iraq it doesn’t look like far fetched idea. If you map non-aversive patterns that targeted individual experience daily and inject aversive element to sensitize him/her to these elements through association, the task is not that hard. Most of the work would be done by TI themselves.
Law enforcement around the world in fight against crime and terrorism is adopting convergence strategy (archive.org) – very complex and wide reaching options to fuse and analyze information to detect, prevent crime and enforce the law in fight against terrorism.
Policing must be a convergent strategy that fights crime and disorder while creating hostile environments for terrorists. The theme of convergence illustrates the coupling of local resources, namely police, with the ability to recognize ordinary crimes that terrorists have been known to commit in preparation for their operational attack: committing traffic violations, obtaining fake identification papers, smuggling, human trafficking, counterfeiting, committing piracy, drug trafficking, or participating in any other criminal enterprise that intersects with terrorists’ needs. Local police serve as the eyes and ears of communities; as such, they are best positioned to observe behaviors that have a nexus to terrorism. It has been the LAPD’s goal to institutionalize the idea of counterterrorism efforts throughout the department and the communities it serves—not to make counterterrorism measures the priority, but a priority. Converging community policing and counterterrorism strategies and implementing them under the guiding philosophy of intelligence-led policing will focus law enforcement efforts and better equip agencies to partner with communities in the pursuit to make the United States safe. Ultimately, the success of all of these convergent strategies will be measured by the prevention of terrorist acts, the countering of extremist ideologies and their local influence, and the resiliency of U.S. communities in the face of man-made and natural disasters.
Again it blurs the line between ordinary crime and terrorism as to justify the use of new surveillance and enforcement powers against population. So if human terrain system is a missing link in policing Iraq and Afghanistan through community policing system and if you pretend that occupying army is police and local tribe is community – what is analogue of human terrain system in democratic world? Is our free world human terrain mapped? Do TI’s stick out like a sore thumb according to some predefined criteria in that software? Community liaison police officer would be something similar to human terrain team member. Crimemapping would be somewhat analogous to human terrain mapping.
Check this abstract where human terrain social scientists propose the solution to Iraqis to prevent IED’s. It’s hard to say if Stanford Prison Experiment used as a model to explain IED’s or as a model to influence prevention:
Akers (1998 and 1985) posits that learned behavior forms the behavioral prerequisites for both normative and deviant actions. Swidler (1986) argues that in unsettled times, individuals return to their ideational toolkits, their definitions, and focus on those elements that will let them survive. Zimbardos (1973) Stanford Prison Experiments clearly demonstrated that the weakest of identities, differential associations, specifically those randomly assigned, become not only strong but destructive under stress. Tajfel (1978), Tajfel and Billings (1974), and Tajfel et al (1971) further demonstrated these concepts. During OIF6/2008 Human Terrain Team Iraq 6 (HTT IZ6) was presented with an educational and learning problem set by the 2BCT/1AD: how to help local Iraqi educators develop a supplementary curriculum in order to promote, teach, and inculcate definitions unfavorable to engaging in suicide bombings and improvised explosive devise (IED) emplacement. The purpose of this paper is to present the theoretical development and implementation of the supplemental curriculum, utilizing social learning theories, by members of HTT IZ6.
Many private contractors are participating in Human Terrain program (archive.org), but it’s not the program itself, but it’s focus on using anthropologists and social scientists and subsequent usage of their generated data for kinetic and non-kinetic actions. War on terror is global so all these methods should be used along the lines of normal law enforcement only in less obvious manner as monitoring, surveillance and threat interpreting apparatus is already in place. So question is once again what is the definition of the threat? Most of TI’s have no idea why are they targeted, just like most of the people on no-fly list have no idea why they were put on it.
There is a book by Tomo Shibato about Organized stalking: The Invisible Maiming Torture Enterprise of Organized Stalking Assaults. I haven’t read it, maybe someone did?
Contrary to popular belief Netwar is not about Internet. If you take organized stalking as some sort of psychological war against individual at least military should have some sort of label for this kind of war. Society stepped in an era of 4th generation warfare, where lines between military, law enforcement and civilian operations get blurred and at least from military point of view any conflict on any scale becomes point of interest and possible way to influence the outcome for own purposes. Average person will have no idea how these theoretical ideas are implemented in real life, neither do I – I might be talking out of my butt. World is constantly evolving and any new modern concept could be another new way of looking at existing things and the next day it could be outdated. So labels are important to the point as to track similarities in concept design. It doesn’t connect dots to individual situation, but it helps in a different way – it shows at least some authority is taking such phenomena seriously. Are they benefactors (by proxy or directly) or as dumbfounded as you are as to how to respond to it it’s hard to say.
Netwar is a term developed by RAND researchers John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt to describe an emergent form of low intensity conflict, crime, and activism waged by social networked actors. Typical netwar actors might include transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, activist groups, and social movements that employ decentralized, flexible network structures.
So if we assume that TI is attacked by a network or organized group where deception plays key part can we call it a netwar? We have no idea what kind of network it is or what is the ultimate purpose of such attack. TI is able observe only the edge of the network through implied and imposed actions. Are all TI’s attacked by same network or every situation is unique and there are as many networks as there are TI’s. Nobody knows and it’s impossible to answer such questions. Is TI attacked because he belongs to some competing social network or simply because of personal reasons?
Networks with many leaders, or no leader, may maintain coordination through a combination of powerful doctrine, ideology, shared beliefs, and/or common interests. This allows all the members of the network to maintain a common objective despite great personal or group autonomy. In other words, this provides an “ideational, strategic, and operational centrality that allows for tactical decentralization.
As Richard Szafranski (1994, 1995) illuminated in his discussions of how information warfare ultimately becomes “neo-cortical warfare,” the challenge for governments and societies becomes “epistemological.” A netwar actor may aim to confound people’s fundamental beliefs about the nature of their culture, society, and government, partly to foment fear but perhaps mainly to disorient people and unhinge their perceptions. This is why a netwar with a strong social content – whether waged by ethnonationalists, terrorists, or social activists— may tend to be about disruption more than destruction. The more epistemological the challenge, the more confounding it may be from an organizational standpoint. Whose responsibility is it to respond? Whose roles and missions are at stake? Is it a military, police, intelli- gence, or political matter? When the roles and missions of defenders are not easy to define, both deterrence and defense may become problematic.
I’m not sure what they tried to imply by the word “epistemological”. Is it about belief and knowledge?
“One of the most common human failings is to examine a complex phenomenon from only one perspective and claim to make definitive conclusions based on that limited perspective.“ (Benjamin I. Higginbotham)
This quote is taken from Higginbotham master thesis on irregular warfare “On Deceiving Terrorists” (local copy). Lots of wisdom in that sentence. It’s like trying to solve a Rubik’s cube by looking at only one face. Either you’ll get extremely lucky by solving it by chance and still be wrong on how it works or you’ll be making moves and evaluating that single face and will be going nowhere, except towards frustration.
Even looking at Rubik’s cube from all planes it’s impossible to solve it without realizing some guiding logic on how it works when you move one face and how other faces are affected by that move. Now imagine the infinite system that is made out of inter-connected Rubik’s cubes where you’re just a sticker on a face of the smallest piece (to make it harder stickers can belong to multiple cubes at the same time). How do you approach solving it? There are forces in place that limits your observation. You have to rely on intuition, assumptions, hearsay, interpretations, correlations, history, etc. How much truth can you distill from that? Is end result belief or knowledge?
Detecting not only deception, but probability of deception is important where you know it maybe crafted to influence your decision making. You can appreciate Copperfield magic trick without projecting that “knowledge” into your real life. Only other magician can tell intricacies of magic tricks. They can detect misdirections, see sleight of hand and follow the routine. They know most of the principles on how illusions works. They can evaluate success or failure on many different criteria. In any case the main point of value of magic trick is not so much the deception, but effect it will cause. Sometimes the simplest trick will cause bigger reaction than most elaborate grandiose magic act. New magic trick is usually just modified old one. Now we are not talking about magic, but deception of actions in real life that directly influence targeted individual to project it into self-harming misleading decisions. Sometimes inaction is better than action, sometimes inaction is deadly.
Further are quotes and excerpts from these thesis as I see a lot of parallels of what is organized stalking all about. Knowing the state of militarization of law enforcement and civilian institutions you can only guess who, how and why would implement such deception operations. The thesis advocates using deception operations against terrorists. Incidentally it is main focus of current state of affairs around the world. Could you be perceived as an enemy if you opposed Iraq war? You know famous Bush quote “you’re with us or against us”? What if you vocalized it in public or in the internet? Who knows how does paranoid authority define an enemy. Another option is leaking of the method and tactics itself into wrong hands and that group adopting to their own purposes. Another option is field research for testing hypothesis, simulated deception wargaming, or just for shits and giggles etc… Every situation is unique so in reality even helping hand could be something entirely different. One has to realize that probably a lot of material on the internet is part of deception (if we assume organized stalking is systematic problem) so to satisfy at least some level of explanation and leading to belief system of self indoctrination, which doesn’t really solve anything.
Deception—the distortion of reality to gain a competitive advantage—is deliberate and results in a specific action. Moreover, deception has two common variants—confusing and misleading—and appears to have utility at multiple levels. First, deception is a deliberate act—never an accident, unintentional deception is not deception but rather misrepresentation. This is significant because it implies that deception requires both intent and effort on the part of the deceiver to deceive. Without intent and effort on the part of the deceiver, an adversary may still draw the wrong conclusions or may be surprised, but those outcomes are not the result of deception. Intent to deceive without some specific resulting action on the part of the deceived party is generally pointless, however.
The third characteristic of deception that merits attention is the fact that virtually all deceptions can be distinguished as one of two variants: ambiguity-increasing or misleading
Ambiguity- increasing deception “confuses a target so that the target is unsure as to what to believe”. Such deceptions seek to ensure that “the level of ambiguity always remains high enough to protect the secret of the actual operation”.
Misleading deceptions, on the other hand, reduce ambiguity by “building up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative”. The ultimate goal of such deceptions, according to Barton Whaley, “is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive, and wrong”
In practice, most elaborate deceptions tend to employ deception ruses of both the ambiguity-increasing and misleading variants. However, although it may be closely related, deception is not synonymous with propaganda, psychological operations (PSYOPs or MISO), operation security (aka secrecy or OPSEC) and camouflage. PSYOPS normally target large groups that do not necessarily have any decision-making power, whereas deception typically targets specific individuals or groups empowered to make decisions. The distinction between propaganda and PSYOPS is a fine one, often depending on one’s perspective. If the target is general perceptions and the message is the truth, the appropriate means is probably PSYOPS. If the target is general perceptions and the message consists of selected truths or even lies, the appropriate means is probably propaganda. OPSEC seeks to limit an adversary’s ability to detect or derive useful information from friendly activities called indicators. By way of contrast, deception generally seeks to increase the likelihood of an adversary’s detection of only certain indicators, usually while hiding others, in order to paint an ambiguous or misleading picture. The relationship between OPSEC and deception is thus a close one, since both generally require the management of indicators. Finally, camouflage consists of efforts by individuals and units to hide, blend in, or disguise in order to prevent enemy observation. Camouflage is, by its definition, conceptually distinct from deception; the goal is almost invariably protection as opposed to provoking a desired response, while the target is an enemy’s sensors (from eyes to high-technology sensor systems) as opposed to enemy decision makers.
Deception is a powerful “force multiplier,” magnifying “the strength or power of the successful deceiver”. Reducing the cost for the deceiver, implies increasing the cost for the deceived.
One means of gaining perspective into how deception works is to break it down into its component parts, defining those activities which, when taken in sum, make up the act of deception. Every deception operation, whether of man or nature, is comprised of only two basic parts: dissimulation and simulation”. Simulation, on the one hand, is that overt, part of a deception presented to the target. The task of simulation is to “pretend, portray, profess” the false: to tell one’s adversary a story sufficiently believable and compelling to cause him to ultimately take some action that will lend the deceiver a competitive advantage (p. 183). Dissimulation, on the other hand, is “hiding the real”. Both simulation and dissimulation are always present together in any single act of deception. Nothing is ever ‘just’ hidden; something is always shown in its stead, even if only implicitly.
The three procedures by which false things are shown [simulation], are mimicking, inventing, or decoying.
Mimicking typically misleads the observer and shows the false by having one thing imitate another. Mimicking is accomplished by duplicating a sufficient number of the distinctive characteristics of the object or activity to be imitated to passably approximate its distinctive pattern. Inventing, the second means of simulation, “shows the false by displaying another reality”.
As opposed to mimicking, in which one object or activity imitates another already existing, inventing “creates something entirely new, albeit false,” by crafting enough new characteristics “to create an entirely new pattern”.
Decoying, the third means of simulation, “shows the false by diverting attention”. Decoying is accomplished by “creating alternative false characteristics that give an additional, second pattern”. In this manner, decoying is “a matter of feints and diversions, literally misdirection”.
The three methods or procedures by which objects or activities are dissimulated, on the other hand, “are masking, repackaging, or dazzling”.
Masking, either interposes a screen, shielding [the real object or activity] from senses (and any intermediate sensors) of the ‘deceivee’ so it is truly covert, or integrates it with its environment so it is unnoticed, blending into its background, literally overlooked, hiding in plain sight”.
In contrast, repackaging, the second means of dissimulation, “is simulated metamorphosis,” which works to hide the real by disguising it. Repackaging modifies the appearance of an activity “by adding or subtracting characteristics to transform them into a new pattern that resembles something else”
Dazzling, the third method of dissimulation, “bewilders, confounds, baffles, perplexes, reducing certainty about the real nature of a thing” in order to hide the real by confusing the observer.This is accomplished by “randomizing or otherwise partially obscuring the characteristics of an object (its precise location, size, color, etc.) or an event (its exact timing, method of operation, etc.) in order to blur their distinctive pattern”
Negative And Positive Deception
Negative deceptive acts are essentially dissimulation: acts undertaken to “prevent the enemy from deducing” the deceiver’s true capabilities and intentions. The negative side of deception is the protection of certain portions of the real operation and plans for future operations. Positive deceptive acts “persuade the enemy to deduce” something other than the ground truth concerning the deceiver’s capabilities and intentions
Passive And Active Deception
Passive deception,” says Handel, is based primarily “on secrecy and camouflage, on hiding and concealing one’s intentions and/or capabilities for the adversary. By way of contrast, “active deception normally involves a calculated policy of disclosing half-truths supported by appropriate ‘proof’ signals or material evidence” which must be picked up by the adversary.
Perception answers the question: what do I see?”. Cognition, on the other hand, tackles the subsequent question: what does it mean?. In both processes, “the mind follows certain rules of convenience, sometimes called biases, which are not always optimal ways of sorting out information. Often these biases favor the deceiver”. Perceptual biases “result from the way the world is perceived and they limit the accuracy of [subsequent] perceptions”. Cognitive biases “result from the way the mind works,” and tend to hinder accurate interpretation. Moreover, “they influence the way that a person treats evidence, attributes causality, and estimates probability.
Taken together, theories on perceptual and cognitive biases may offer an explanation for how and why deceptive messages are ultimately interpreted the way they are. If deceptions can be designed to take advantage of enemy perceptual and cognitive biases, the target will theoretically do much of the work of deception for the deceiver.
To successfully deceive, “The overall activity must not only provide believable indicators of the false operation, but must deny believable indicators of the real operations”. Deceptions are “well coordinated, when directed from one central point—that being the highest headquarters” or lead agency controlling assets “directly benefiting from the deception” or when the activities of the various agencies are coordinated sufficiently to prevent the compromise of the deception. This ensures that all instruments of power are integrated into deception planning, and all actions are consistent with the deception story. Deception must be well organized and well coordinated, else leaks may occur and deception unravel. A deception operation must be directed and controlled by a single element” in order to avoid confusion, compromise, “and to ensure that the various elements involved in the deception are portraying the same story and are not in conflict with other operational objectives Knowledge of what the enemy will accept as plausible and what degree of confirmation is necessary before he will believe, is a firm requirement for a successful deception. If the target has no observable preconceptions regarding a particular activity or if sufficient intelligence information is not available to ascertain the target’s preconceptions, it is possible to create certain expectations on the part of the target. “Here, the deceiver sets up the target for a future surprise by conditioning him to expect something he hadn’t considered before”. The deception must be able to change as reality changes”. “Cover stories, communications channels, and specific initiatives require fine tuning to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities or problems”. As a result, adaptability is a necessary component of every successful deception. “An adaptable deception,” in turn, “requires the ability to react to change and also requires knowledge about when to react. Adaptability allows the deceiver to continue deceptions for a longer time, to react to unforeseen changes in the situation, to take advantage of unforeseen or unpredictable enemy actions and reactions, and to protect valuable intelligence and deception resources by ending the stratagem if the deception wears thin or is compromised. If adaptability is a necessary component of every successful deception, feedback is the mechanism that makes adaptability possible. “The ultimate asset that allows deceivers to adapt their scenarios” to changing situations, “is feedback from the target” . One of the most basic problems of deception is creating a story and indicators that the target will accept as valid.
A key component of plausibility is confirmation. “A lie is made more plausible, when it has been confirmed by a variety of credible sources” or means. Confirming details are necessary because virtually every target of deception continues to seek information to support his conclusion. Given the role of perceptual and cognitive biases, a target is far more likely to accept data that confirms his hypotheses: “the target is likely to ignore, twist, or explain away those details that do not fit, and often those are the incongruities on which the deception hinges. If there is no confirming data, however, the target is likely to receive sufficient contradictory information to overcome his cognitive biases and see through the deception more easily. If the strictest secrecy is not observed, all deception projects are condemned to failure from the very start. There are two levels on which such secrecy must be maintained. “One tries to protect the truth about what a side [actually] intends to do in an impending operation,” while the other tries to “protect the truth about the existence of the deception itself”. Breaches of security…need not be fatal to deception’s success. Some leaks may not catch the target’s attention, and, if they do, may only increase his ambiguity.
Finally, in order to guide those who will conduct deception against terrorists, more research is needed to suggest the role that psychology plays in deception. Since there is no universal psychological profile for terrorists, some other means of predicting the vulnerabilities and reactions of terrorists to deception is necessary. One possible starting place for that research is in the area of influence psychology—the study of how we all are affected by what amount to universal influence principles, such as reciprocity, commitment and consistency, liking, and others. Terrorists are, after all, human, and are—within reason—predictably subject to the same psychological principles as everybody else.
This is from Moving the Work of Criminal Investigators Towards Crime Control (2011): Findings of Seminal Research Studies on Police Investigation of Serious Crimes. Many TI’s have some sort of hope and expectation that law enforcement might help them throughout ordeal, but is the system capable to deal with such crime as organized stalking?
3.Contrary to fictional portrayals, detectives do not work from facts to identification of suspects; they work from identification of suspects back to facts that are necessary to prosecute and convict them. The primary job of detectives is not to find unknown suspects, but to collect evidence required for a successful prosecution of known suspects. Although fictional detectives are constantly warning against the danger of forming a hypothesis too early, that is precisely what real detectives do most of the time. For all the drama of novels, movies and television, the fact is that criminal investigation is largely a matter of processing paperwork. This does not make it easy. Knowledge of the law and of people is critically important. But it is work that does not rely on the skills of Kojak or Dirty Harry. Instead, it requires the steady discipline and persistence of an accountant or bank examiner.
1.The vast majority of crime that police investigate is brought to their attention by the public. Police discover very little crime on their own. Except for a few proactive investigations into corruption, vice, and organized crime, most criminal investigations involve crimes that have been committed, not those in progress or not yet committed.
2.The essential ingredient in solving almost every crime is the identification of the suspect by the public. If the offender is not caught on the spot, success depends on the victim or witnesses providing information that specifically identifies the likely suspect, such as a name, address, license plate number, or relation to the victim. If an offender has not been identified by the public for detectives, the chances of solving any crime fall to about 10 percent.
4.More crimes are solved through information provided by arrested or convicted offenders — called “secondary clearances” — than are solved by the original work of the police. Indeed, the major opportunity for raising clearance rates — the ratio of solved crimes to reported crimes — lies in having the police work more systematically to encourage criminals to confess to previous criminal acts.
5.Detectives generally have more information about particular crimes than they can assimilate and use. Furthermore, physical or forensic evidence makes only a small contribution to either detection or prosecution.
6.Neither the way in which criminal investigation is organized nor caseloads of detectives affect the success police have in solving crimes.
Even though police adapting all different kind of revolutionary strategies to fight crime crime clearing statistics confirm Dorothy Guyot who famously described, creating change in police departments can be like “bending granite.”
Of course above statistics doesn’t reflect the volume of crime:
So if we assume that these statistics are consistent and clearly represent the real world and have not been intentionally interpreted in a ways to represent data so it’s favourable to the presenter we can say that crime rates have been dropping since 1992. After 2000 they stabilized and didn’t veer too much off the course (no pun intended GWB), but overall crime situation has been “on the wrong foot” to say it mildly. Crime clearing rates doesn’t really appear to be a priority – they always remained pretty much the same independent of the volume of the crime. So obviously police will always stress the statistics that are favourable to them as in second pic. Besides statistics doesn’t matter much to TI, but understanding how crime is perceived and battled is important to finding the ways to address the issue. Some of these statements also explain why it could be hard to solve this crime (assuming organized stalking is not part of the unwritten and existing system of social control) – even if police set up a surveillance and catch a perpetrator or two they can only implicate them on the particular harassment instance which would be no real help in uncovering bigger picture. It’s quite possible that most perpetrators are not aware of the whole picture and they know only what they need to know. If you tried to ask low level employee like newspaper delivery boy about some organizational issues of Washington Post (the newspaper he delivers) – he will not know and he doesn’t care. He might not even be employed by Washington Post.
It is interesting article about prospects of policing towards proactive and preventive policing. They argue that average cop doesn’t have deep knowledge much about intricacies, methods, technologies and tactics of crime investigation. They are law enforcement front line on the streets and they could benefit of expertise that criminal investigator has amassed throughout his specialized education and career in the field.
It come to my attention a few articles describing egregious RIPA law abuses in UK. RIPA was enacted to provide powers to law enforcement to fight threats to national security: terrorism, internet crime, serious organized crime, paedophilia, etc. I’m no law or national security expert so my impressions based on news reports might be superficial. The point is intentionality of the law. Even after numerous abuses surfaced in the press over the years – not much has been changed or has there? I don’t think anyone was held accountable. So one would make an assumption that public outcry generated wasn’t enough to curtail it’s abuses since it’s not really an abuse.
It’s just a tool that can make targeting crime easier, terrorism or not. Crime is crime. At least in the eyes of the ones who are able to use it. If you can solve a problem why not, right? So the important part of these articles is not so much the description of abuses, but the framing of defence by accused. Some avoided to disclose the usage at all. Others justified it after being confronted. Between 2000 and 2009 the Tribunal setup to investigate abuses has only upheld 4 out of 956 complaints.
Council chiefs – while refusing to reveal where the tree was – have defended using RIPA, stating that nearby residents were concerned the tree was being “attacked”.
Alarmingly, seven public authorities refused under the Freedom of Information Act to disclose why or how often they have used the powers. They included the BBC and Ofsted.
The spies are called ‘covert human intelligence sources’. In many cases they will be council employees, such as dog wardens or trading standards officials, but school children are sometimes recruited to test for the sale of underage alcohol or cigarettes.
‘Despite nearly ten thousand investigations in three years, most resulted in no action being taken, reinforcing the need for a comprehensive review.’
He said: “This legislation is what we are required to use if we want to carry out surveillance on suspected fraudsters, con-artists, cowboy builders and flytippers and catch them red-handed. We make no apology for using all the powers Parliament has given us to try and catch people who rip off consumers and taxpayers.”
Common misconception that these laws were reaction to 9/11 attack. In fact they were enacted in 2000 and expanded multiple times in later years.
Nowadays, however, for reasons unfathomable, every authority of whatever kind, from local councils and trading standards – and that latter one can still be understood – over the Milk Marketing Board equivalent and the one responsible for eggs and whatever else, aside from police, security services and HMRC, that is to say Customs and Excise, are given such covert surveillance powers. (archive.org)
One can only speculate how professional are these spies who are using these newly obtained powers to investigate their targets. It’s not far fetched to imagine that it will not take long for innocent person to notice that he is being followed and spied upon. Getting paranoid. Going on the internet finding some info about gangstalking “brighting”, “red cars” and ball starts rolling as it’s easy to apply situational environment to new belief structure. I’m not putting every targeted individual in that category, but I believe some cases might be stemming from situations like this. The real issue is that public resources can be abused for personal gain as long as you’re able to define and frame the problem as requiring authority attention on the target. Knowing the cooperation and information sharing across all agencies one can only speculate how it goes from there.
Now looking at England you have to assume that something similar is going on in most other liberal democracies on bigger or smaller scale, since law structuring and layering has to be more or less compatible around EU in order to effectively cooperate and participate in common goals in defending from terrorist threat. I guess UK is more transparent with it’s Freedom of Information Act so these “abuses” surface to public attention. Abuse is only in the eyes of beholder.
None of these articles try to investigate affect the targeted covert spying had on people in question, how it affected their lives.
You’ve got to balance it against their human rights as well because if we say ‘ok this person is a non statutory prolific offender and we’re going to visit them every day for the next three months’ if there’s absolutely no intelligence or no indication that they’re committing crime you can’t really say that that is proportionate.
POLICE are targeting the homes of persistent offenders in a bid to drive down crime.Cops are targeting known offenders in Dewsbury and Mirfield on a daily basis with the aim of keeping them on the straight and narrow. More than 20 repeat offenders, known in police jargon as ‘red nominals’, are currently subject to the so-called ‘disruption visits’ across Kirklees. Neighbourhood Policing Teams call at the homes of the criminals – sometimes up to twice a day – to check what they are up to, and who they are associating with.Information on the clothes they are wearing and the vehicles they are driving is also then fed into the police intelligence network. The scheme is being co-ordinated by the Kirklees Integrated Offender Management Unit and as well as the police other agencies are heavily involved, including the Drugs Intervention Project (DIP), the Probation Service, Lifeline, Job Centre Plus and housing agencies
If you are aware of a hotspot, say a particular hotel or café, you can educate the staff. “Are you aware that [this area] has a particular problem with adults taking advantage of young people? People are using your premises and so you can help us to stop that.’ In some areas hotels and taxi offices have been provided with information about exploitation: ‘not accusing them, but the approach was this is the sort of thing that happens, if you know about it, let us know.’
An important aspect of targeting offenders is their arrest and conviction for burglary offences, but evidential limitations mean that this is not always possible.Consider sending persistent offenders Christmas or birthday cards as a reminder of police attention;
UK also created restricted Police OnLine Knowledge Area – POLKA, sort of online forum where police will be able to share knowledge, best practices and crime fighting tactics. Now lets look at US Gang Unit tactics to target suspected gang members by using suppression and psychological warfare methods. This is from the book called “Into Abyss” (or local pdf copy here) 2002 by Mike Carlie. The description of endless cycle is interesting:
This tactic is more significant than it first appears. I will discuss the premise this is founded upon. Citizens with information or concerned about gangs were directed to me. I often arrived at work and found thirty to forty voice mails on my telephone. I listened to their messages then contacted those with the most promising information. All the messages with potential gang information were forwarded to our department’s Crime Analyst. She sorted through and summarized their content then provided a report with the most significant information underlined. I distributed the reports to the rest of the gang unit. The officers then starting driving by the locations from which the calls originally came and wrote descriptions of vehicles in the vicinity, their license numbers, etc. I contacted the citizens discretely and provided them with the cellular phone and pager numbers for my unit’s officers. That way the citizens would not get the normal run around by calling 911. The citizens became our eyes and ears. We had so few officers that this was a necessity if we were going to be effective. When citizens called and got immediate service they were happy. Since we started showing up at just the right time (when trouble was brewing), the gang members thought some of their cronies were snitching on them. This sometimes caused distrust and dissention – they never really knew who they could trust. When we were alerted that something was going on, we moved into the area wearing our POLICE vests, jackets, and insignia. We stopped cars using our red lights, and talked to interested people in the area. They were possible future information sources. The troublemakers thought “Holly cow the cops are all over us – they know what we are doing!” Hopefully they would move to another area then it would take a few months for the new neighbors to identify the trouble makers and the process would start again. (Personal correspondence, police Lieutenant, department gang unit, November, 2001)
Same report officers talking about psychological tactics trying to induce paranoia:
Some gang unit officers attempt to instill paranoia in gang members’ minds in hopes of turning gang members against one another. A gang supervisor told me “Sometimes I get information about gang activity from local residents. I may use that information and, if it leads to arresting a gang member, he’ll say ‘How’d you know about that? Who’s been talkin’ to you?’ Then I tell him ‘I have snitches. You know that. Do you really know your friends?’ Then he starts getting paranoid and starts wondering which one of his own are talking to the police. It works. We keep them off balance like that.” That’s a form of psychological warfare. Field Note: A gang unit member said “Sometimes I get dropped off in an alley, behind some gangster’s house or where there’s some gang activity taking place. The other officers drive up in front of the house, maybe slam on the brakes and make a little noise.Then they throw the car door open, I run from behind the house and jump into the car and we take off. Scares the hell out of ’em! They get paranoid thinking that cops are hiding everywhere. ‘Hey, look up there. Inside that street light! I see a camera. They’re watchin’ us from everywhere!'”
The absence of strong departmental oversight and the physical separation of gang units from the rest of the police force — three of four units operated from “secret” off-site facilities that were known only to gang unit officers — contributed to a “decoupling [that] led gang unit officers to isolate themselves from the rest of the police organization and from the community and its citizens.” Although gang units are supposed to afford an opportunity for officers to develop specialized expertise, the authors found that the officers were poorly trained and had little direct exposure to gang members: an average of just one to three contacts per eight hours worked.
Estonians (link siseministeerium.ee/2766/ has been removed no alternatives available – it’s ironic that estonians are such great leaders in information technology and still fall for modernized ancient orwellian methods of information destruction. Probably North Koreans are less orwellian in this department.) also adopting disruption tactics or measures, but they call them “disturbance tactics”. Maybe something got lost in translation, maybe they felt that its more appropriate title for such operations:
In the middle of November a new tactics of maintaining law and order was implemented in Tallinn and this concerns the increasing of the number of street guards in Tallinn, the application of the disturbance tactics of criminals which has been internationally used, paying more attention to the lawbreakers who are foreigners and controlling the legitimacy of pawnshops-purchasing agents.
A more recent example are the intelligence/investigative programs that develop tactics of disruption; national security can be protected without such practices. Ways are needed to enforce laws without violating standards of decency and fairness. All of us with criminal justice responsibilities need to examine and reexamine every aspect of our work for both legality and fairness. Our measure should be fairness, justice, and effectiveness.
This is interesting article as it shows then government is forced to look at organized stalking seriously since it’s used as one of the tools as part of influence campaign for destabilizing the political order by designated terrorist organization ETA in Basque Country. The name is very appropriate and most targets from around the world would agree with such label – psychological terrorism. Of course the most obvious culprit is CIA (or as some refer to it as organized crime, mafia, alqaeda, etc having examined only little bit information of what is allowed for them to examine), but Spanish government can’t really do much as it’s probably heavily infiltrated and compromised by CIA as is the case with the rest of EU/World.
This paper defines and analyzes the harassment perpetrated by ETA’s terrorist network in the Basque Country, providing a taxonomy of its strategies of psychological violence. The usefulness of this taxonomy has been tested and contrasted by means of a content analysis of 19 testimonies of persons who were the victims of violence by the terrorist network. The taxonomy of strategies of psychological violence is made up of four dimensions that emphasize the actions on the context of the persons affected, and on their emotional state, cognitions, and behaviour. Results show the predominance of emotional and cognitive strategies. Second sub-category is formed essentially by different forms of verbal abuse: «I find myself walking past a particular bar (refers to bars which ETA sympathizers frequent), and hearing somebody say —there goes that bastard—». Stigmatization consists of acts perpetrated fundamentally in a public space with the aim of marking out a person. This may involve graffiti, pictures, banners or other forms in public places, designating the person as an «enemy» and as a «target» of the terrorist network: «I frequently received insults in the street…». Though these acts can entail other strategies, as a threat, they have a wider impact because the person is stigmatized in the presence of neighbours, workmates or classmates, and society: «My name was written in insulting banners at the Faculty in which I studied». With Control-surveillance of daily activities the target is usually informed by the Security Forces that he/she has appeared on a list of targets of the terrorist network. Some collaborators or even sympathizers may obtain information on the target which could be used to aid future acts of violence. These collaborators may be from his/her neighbourhood or work, among others. This, together with being a potential target of the terrorist network, may cause uncertainty: «Some of my neighbours try to get information on potential targets to pass onto the terrorists. The police told me that a shop assistant of a greengrocer’s close to my home was doing this». Restrictive acts of freedoms may also include elements of other strategies, but here the nuance consists of putting pressure on the target through the presence of people. This pressure may be applied by a public demonstration or protest march in front of the person, thus restricting their freedom. «The radicals (referring to ETA sympathizers) gathered in front of my home»; «…A dozen or more young radicals arrived, and they insulted and threatened me, and placed a banner against the doorway of my home». A strategy of isolation and social exclusion, attempts to ostracise the target and encourage his/her isolation in society. Sometimes by means of intimidation of persons of his/her socialenvironment: «We often went to a bar. We thought they were friends…, we used to have a good time, we used to drink a few beers there… the night began there… and then one day, we were taken to the back room of the bar. They told us they had received a letter threatening to burn down the bar if they continued to sell us beers». The frequency of this was the lowest. It is important to point out that in small towns or villages where the terrorist network’s sympathizers may be predominant, it is easier to control and encourage the isolation of the person The evolution of ETA’s structure -both its cells and its network has facilitated a new form of violence in the Basque Country. This aggression has changed towards continual harassment reinforced by selective physical violence. According to De la Calle (2007) the new terrorist network strategy of kale borroka violence including PV now plays an alternative role as a complementary tool to terrorist murders. From here, new groups have been victimized by pressurising Basque society and creating insecurity and fear. The terrorist network has tried to discourage people who express their opposition to the organization, using a legitimation discourse of intimidation and blackmail (Van den Broek, 2004). This makes terrorism a social communication mechanism, aimed at modifying behaviour by combining coercion and persuasion (Schmid, 2004).
Have you seen this new documentary “Top Priority: The Terror Within” about Julie Davis (ukrainian born immigrant – i’d like to someone to double check her own immigration history and steps she has undertaken to obtain legal status/green card/citizenship), the Border and Custom control agent who reported the serious security issue to FBI and got to experience blow-back of crazy proportions by DHS and ICE. In the end she persevered and got cleared from all charges in the court of law and wrote a book and had a documentary made about this ordeal. Reviews are mainly supportive as far as the cause being investigated although the style of telling the story doesn’t bode well with any of them. It doesn’t appear to be investigatory documentary rather than visual story telling as it leaves lots of raised questions unanswered. I haven’t seen the movie, but my impression so far that they are trying to capitalize on the story (most likely totally made up) by stressing elements that are not so much about the issue, but about how to appeal to general public. Anyhow if you consider her as targeted individual who’s been vindicated in the court of law it would be interesting to find out if there are some lessons to be learned from this case. She never mentions any of the psychological harassment tactics – it’s all about hard disruption tactics.
A total of 54 retaliatory investigations have been commenced in an attempt to discredit Julia as an upstanding law enforcement officer and a staunch American patriot. Julia Davis, her family members and witnesses who dared to support her were subjected to land and aerial surveillance, to the tune of millions – at the expense of American taxpayers. This included warrantless aerial surveillance with fixed-wing airplanes and Blackhawk helicopters, vehicular surveillance, OnStar tracking, Internet monitoring, wiretaps, warrantless searches and seizures and series of other outrageous, unwarranted retaliatory measures.
Incorporating dramatic re-creations, computer simulations, hysterical graphics and the seemingly incessant sound of helicopters, “Top Priority” tells the story of Julia Davis, a Ukrainian immigrant-cum-U.S. Customs officer stationed at the San Ysidro border-crossing in San Diego. There, Davis reported a seemingly critical lapse in security that occurred July 4, 2004: Twenty-three citizens of “special-interest countries ” — aka terrorist nations — managed to cross into the United States without the required interrogation or paperwork, at a time when Homeland Security had fixed the Fourth of July as a likely time for an Al Qaeda encore to 9/11.
She makes some interesting observations on her blog (archive.org) (why would you take a photo of yourself with Karl Rove?)
Leakers and whistleblowers are often incorrectly placed in the same category by the press. The main difference between the way the government approaches these two distinctly different groups is that leakers are prosecuted for their leaks to the media, while whistleblowers are usually attacked in more covert ways and accused of unrelated ”offenses” as a pretext for retaliating against them through the use of our legal system that was supposed to protect them. They get transferred, demoted, reprimanded, accused of sexual offenses or misconduct and eventually fired, prosecuted, crushed. Very few come out intact on the other side of the whistleblower grinder, while the government cranks up the handle faster than ever.
The press tends to profile the leakers more often than whistleblowers. There seem to be two prevailing reasons for that: (1) leakers are often the sources for some of the best stories and (2) their stories are more straightforward, since they’re charged with offenses surrounding their disclosures. Retaliation against whistleblowers often morphs into completely unrelated accusations and prosecutions that on their surface are not related to their whistleblowing disclosure (but at heart are the very reason for the persecution in question). Those are more complex stories that are being left up to the authors and filmmakers to untangle, while the mainstream media concentrates on Weinergate, celebrity break-ups and similar trivial pursuits.
In this post i want to look at organized stalking from psychiatry, anti-psychiatry and Zen view. Psychiatry would most likely define organized stalking claims as schizophrenia, where depending on the description of situation by the victim(patient) the diagnosis would be narrowed further down with persecutory delusions, auditory hallucinations, etc. At the moment it’s not important the definition itself, but the conditions that would precipitate such point in time where victim is pushed to the stage where he might even think that he deserves this label or the pain is so unbearable that he might capitulate in form of surrendering towards mental help professionals. Psychiatry and science is aware that schizophrenia is not a brain disorder – there is nothing wrong with the brain of the patients – all kind of advanced scans do not show any differences between ill person and healthy individual.
Schizophrenia can’t be tested and confirmed in a lab. If it’s a cognitive disorder it’s logical to think that environment could be artificially arranged so that necessary defining patterns of the thinking will be induced into victim to manifest in diagnosis. Schizophrenia with it’s all encompassing symptoms is hard to define – before PTSD was accepted as valid illness – soldiers from Korea war and WWII used to be given schizophrenia label. As Gregory Bateson (local copy) said “I’m not sure that I’ve ever met anybody that doesn’t suffer from “schizophrenia P” more or less”. He also articulated a related theory of schizophrenia as stemming from double bind situations. What is double bind and how it might apply towards targeted individuals?
In a somewhat modified and expanded definition, the ingredients of a double bind can be described as follows: (1) Two or more persons are involved in an intense relationship that has a high degree of survival value for one, several, or all of them. (2) In such a context, a message is given which is so structured that (a) it asserts something, (b) it asserts something about its own assertion and (c) these two assertions are mutually exclusive. Thus, if the message is an injunction, it must be disobeyed to be obeyed . The meaning of the message is, therefore, undecidable . (3) Finally, the recipient of the message is prevented from stepping outside the frame set by this message. Therefore, even though the message is logically meaningless, it is a pragmatic reality: he cannot not react to it, but neither can he react to it appropriately. A person in a double bind situation is therefore likely to find himself punished for correct perceptions, and defined as “bad” or “mad” for even insinuating that there should be a discrepancy between what he does see and what he “should” see.
Double binds are often utilized as a form of control without open coercion—the use of confusion makes them difficult to respond to or resist.
A double bind generally includes different levels of abstraction in orders of messages, and these messages can be stated or implicit within the context of the situation, or conveyed by tone of voice or body language. Further complications arise when frequent double binds are part of an ongoing relationship to which the person or group is committed.
I don’t know about you, but i feel double bind closely describes the state that targeted individuals find themselves trapped in. So at this point is not so much about denying or accepting psychiatry as valid science – it’s about finding a way that would transcend into solution. Neither psychiatry nor anti-psychiatry can provide answers – they can only provide insights and labels as to why specific stimulus is used to create discomfort and stress. Psychiatry research can’t be discounted since they are official gatekeepers of the problem either they realize it or not. So their interpretations and field notes could be valuable as to how organized stalking is used as social control.
Strangely enough similar technique is used by Zen Buddhism as a positive tool to achieve enlightenment, where student is given self-contradictory question and has to find an answer eg:
If you say yes, I will beat you. If you say no, I will beat you. Go and find out the answer, find out whether a dog has a Buddha nature or not. And whatever answer you come back with, I am going to beat you!
What is the sound of one hand clapping?
So how does one solve a puzzle that is impossible to solve without transcending it into higher level of understanding? Zen Buddhism rejects the notion that the problem can be solved with the mind, logic and thinking alone, but in organized stalking case I think it’s important to learn and understand the construct of the problem since it comes from western bureaucratic and technological model of thought instead of eastern way of thinking geared towards enlightenment. Of course you might say Zen students are not trying to survive and their lives are not threatened if they don’t find the answer to the question and you’ll be right (the most they risk of losing is time and money – they are taken for a ride by scammers they like it or not)… At the same time you have to understand that driving force for Zen student to reach enlightenment is similar as it’s existential kind. By Zen students i had in mind westerners who try to better themselves, the situation might be entirely different for all those Tibetan little children abducted by force from their families, imprisoned in these monasteries as some sort of tabula rasa material cattle and raised with these evil dogtooth methods, probably with good dose of bacha bazi pedophilia mixed in.
Operation Leopard is the latest weapon in the fight against antisocial behaviour to receive government backing. Pioneered by officers in Essex policing difficult estates, it deploys forward intelligence teams (FITs) – units trained to gather evidence at foxhunts, protests and football matches – in areas suffering from crime.
FIT officers target a hit list of individuals who are “known to police”, and subject them to repeated surveillance.
Although officers claimed targets could choose not to be filmed, none of those stopped in the presence of the Guardian around 15 suspects and associates were given that choice.
Lee, 19, said he had been stigmatised. “I admit I was a little shit back in the past, but who ain’t?” he said. “I’ve grown up now I’m chilled these days. The old bill don’t let us move on. They keep on classing us as criminals.”
For civil rights groups, the operation is an Orwellian technique that persecutes individuals who have committed no crime. But for police, the “in your face” approach works and, unlike covert surveillance, it requires no special authorisation.
For civil rights groups, which have complained about Operation Leopard, this is precisely the problem. Some activists have launched a counterattack, subjecting FIT officers to surveillance. Turning their own cameras on FIT, activists have started posting officers’ names, faces and badge numbers online.
Back at the station, the officers logged on to one of the websites, Fitwatch, and vented their frustration at “revenge attacks”. One said being filmed felt “unnerving”.
video of operation leopard (videos have been removed):
In Experiment 1 we examined the effect of the insult on the immediate emotional reaction o f the participant and on subsequently expressed hostility during the rest o f the experiment. Subsequent hostility was assessed with a word-completion task, a face-rating task, and a neutral scenario-completion task to see if the participant would project his anger onto these stimuli. We also assessed hostility by having the participant complete the ending o f a scenario that involved affront and sexual challenge. These procedures allowed us to examine whether (a) relatively neutral stimuli would bring out aggression after priming by the insult or (b) only subsequent stimuli that also involve affront or challenge would bring out aggression.
Experiment 1: Students came to the laboratory of the Institute for Social Research, where they were informed that the experiment concerned the effects of “limited response time conditions on certain facets of human judgment.” After an initial introduction to the experiment, participants were told to fill out a short demographic questionnaire and were asked to take it to a table at the end of a long, narrow hallway. As the participant walked down the hall, a confederate of the experimenter walked out of a door marked “Photo Lab” and began working at a file cabinet in the hall. The confederate had to push the file drawer in to allow the participant to pass by him and drop his paper off at the table. As the participant returned seconds later and walked back down the hall toward the experimental room, the confederate (who had re opened the file drawer) slammed it shut on seeing the participant approach and bumped into the participant with his shoulder, calling the participant an “asshole.” The confederate then walked back into the “Photo Lab.” Two observers were stationed in the hall. They appeared to be working on homework, paying no attention to the goings-on in the hall. One (male) observer was seated on the floor in a location where he could glance up and see the participant’s face at the moment he was bumped. The other (female) observer was sitting at the table at the end of the hall where she could glance at the participant’s face if he turned around (which occurred about 86% of the time across Experiments 1 and 3 ). Both observers could hear everything the participant said and could read his body language (though from different perspectives). Immediately after the bumping incident, the observers rated the participant’s emotional reactions on 7-point scales. The reactions of anger and amusement were the ones of greatest interest, but observers also rated how aroused, flustered, resigned, or wary participants seemed.
In Experiment 2 we explored whether, for southerners, responses to insult go beyond annoyance and mere cognitive priming for aggression and are accompanied by physiological changes of a sort that might mediate genuine behavioral aggression. We also attempted to test whether insulted southern participants would be motivated to demonstrate their toughness.
In Experiment 3 we tried to extend the results o f Experiments 1 and 2 by exploring whether southerners would perceive an insult as damaging to their status and reputation (consistent with a culture-of-honor worldview) and would actually behave in more aggressive and domineering ways after an insult. We examined three major sets of variables.
Method 2 and 3 becomes more refined and they start looking for more subtleties. So the question arises if the research really about the difference between the southerners and northerners males or it’s under guise to test some stress induction methods and get some data. Of course everyone knows that calling someone asshole would pretty much insult any person be it from south, west, east or north. What is unknown how much stress it generates. It’s common knowledge that southerners are more temperamental than northerners, but this experiment is just strange as I’m not sure what they gained by insulting almost 500 people. Their reward for the trouble: $5-10.
I try to look at the phenomena from many different angles and it’s hard to put it in an existing framework that would describe it in non authoritarian language. What bugged me was the multiple use of words “research” and “researcher” in Offender-based Policing and Pulling Levers strategies that I blogged about some time ago. So I assumed there had to be some experimental and scientific methods involved in this crime control framework. Again at this moment it’s all but presumptions and information gathering that might fit the profile of gangstalking at hand. Since organized stalking is for most part social issue (if we look at how much of it observable to TI) we have to look at the practices and research methods that would we could correlate with that discipline. Now looking at quantitative research approaches and methods a lot of it could be applicable towards gangstalking phenomena:
Qualitative research aims to understand how people think about the world and how they act and behave in it. This approach requires researchers to understand phenomena based on discourse, actions and documents, and how and why individuals interpret and ascribe meaning to what they say and do, and to other aspects of the world (including other people) they encounter.
Some qualitative studies extend beyond individuals’ personal experiences to explore interactions and processes within organizations or other environments. Knowledge at both an individual and a cultural level is treated as socially constructed. This implies that all knowledge is, at least to some degree, interpretive, and hence, dependent on social context. It is also shaped by the personal perspective of the researcher as an observer and analyst. As a result, qualitative researchers devote a great deal of attention to demonstrating the trustworthiness of their findings using a range of methodological strategies.
The section below provides a summary description of the general approach, as well as methodological requirements and practices, of qualitative research, some of which may also apply to quantitative or other types of research involving humans.
Phenomenology, in Husserl’s conception, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection on and study of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. This phenomenological ontology can be clearly differentiated from the Cartesian method of analysis which sees the world as objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another.
We have to keep in mind that qualitative research is very encompassing (even peeping tom could say he is doing covert observational qualitative research into disrobing practices in bedrooms by females), but if we dissect organized stalking by it’s defining characteristics and assume some of that data itself is important, collected and assessed by scientific approach then we can predict that at least some of the aspects of it will be hidden in plain sight in criminology, psychology and sociology research. In this case qualitative research (field study, covert) would be more into community behavior itself rather than into TI. The research into TI would be something along the lines of “case study” eg perception of injustice. TI’s need to realize that community is also disrupted during process of abuse as they also have to shift focus from their daily lives to address this new concern. I don’t know what could be the possible purpose or measurable indicators of the research – maybe cohesiveness of community towards a threat, under guise of building community label or similar. So keywords to start looking for something would be covert field study by using qualitative research, ethnographic, phenomenology, phenomenological research and narrative research.
In some ‘covert’ participant–observation studies, social researchers defend their omission of informed consent on the basis of a need to protect subjects from apprehension, nervousness, or even criminal prosecution. In other instances, researchers contend that deception is rampant in society, and that their methods are no more immoral than the behaviour that ordinarily prevails. These defenses of covert methods fail to appreciate the range of risks that may be involved, and in the latter case, fail to show that these methods are in fact morally indistinguishable from the ‘deception’ that people typically engage in. Ultimately, these proposed defenses of covert methods succeed only in arousing greater concern about informed consent in social research, and the researcher’s privilege in bypassing it.
In this post I want to look into gossip mechanisms, effects and influence on our perception and behavior if looking from organized stalking target, populace and exploiter position.
Almost every targeted individual mentions pervasive gossip and rumors behind their back that have been overheard or assumed to be going on based on first time encounters with stranger and sensing undeserved negative attitude and energy towards them. So gossip and rumor has to be very influential for gang stalking process if we assume that organized stalking is not a spontaneous occurrence based on other factors. We also have to take into account the option of the nature of the rumors to take life of their own and evaluate the incident knowing that attack could be disciplined or natural occurrence based on preexisting natural curiosity and nosiness of people in others around them. Gossip has been around as long as humanity existed, so we have to take in account it’s natural role in shaping our behavior and culture. So this posts not so much personal view of the issue, but rather academic definitions and insights. I think it’s important to weigh in gossip as natural social mechanism of any community in order to distinguish so called “perps” and those who are just receptive for information, etc. Even negative behavior towards a target by third party could be not so much as aversive measure, but rather defensive/protective based on nature of rumor and it’s interpretation. So in the end it’s not the gossip itself that matters, but who concocted and spread the rumor. I’ll be using “Research on Gossip: Taxonomy, Methods, and Future Directions” (local copy) (2004) that reviews half century of gossip research from multiple disciplines. It is very interesting article and I would recommend it to read for any targeted individual.
Strong evidence that evaluations traveling through the network tend to stop short of their targets, concluded that a norm seems to exist “to keep people from learning too much about what others think of them”, in this issue, also acknowledge that gossip affords one the benefits of various veins of social comparison while avoiding the risks of embarrassment or confrontation. Thus, gossip, far from violating privacy, may be construed as a protective social norm.
Slade (1997) distinguished five types of informal conversation and reported that about one seventh (14%) of the time spent in workplace coffee-break conversation consisted of gossip. However, because she limited her definition to negative gossip, the percentage would presumably be higher with positive remarks included.
Gossip about others who are present is probably better labeled public disclosure or ridicule (Kuttler et al., 2002; which may or may not be made innocuous by other facets of the situation). For the most part, authors agree that day-to-day gossip refers to talk about absent third parties.
Although the surface of a gossipy conversation may appear casual, idle, or trivial (Rosnow, 2001), the meta-communicative value is of quite a different kind when we include the evaluative components, implied or explicit, that usually accompany such communications.
Mettetal (1982) observed positive and negative gossip among adolescents, although exchanges among younger peers were likely to be more negative, suggesting that maturity may play a part in developing a more subtle and complex form
The situational aspect of gossip cannot be entirely separated from the content of the gossip, any more than the functions of gossip can be separated from the form; the inherent meaning of the content depends on these other factors.
She remarked upon gossip as socially beneficial in that it facilitates information flow, provides recreation, and strengthens control sanctions, thereby creating group solidarity. Yet, it also can be “an outlet for hostile aggression” (Stirling, 1956, p. 263). Stirling thus implied the four social functions of gossip encountered repeatedly in gossip literature in the years since her article: information, entertainment, friendship (or intimacy), and influence.
Gossip as entertainment can be readily inferred by observing conversationalists passing the time gossiping. Although the gossipee might certainly be sensitive about the information being passed, this does not obviate the fact that gossip can exist solely for the entertainment or recreational value of the gossipers. It is “the sheer fun which for most gossipers explains their involvement”
Establishing friendship at the dyadic or group level is closely related to boundary enforcement and gossip’s influence function, widely discussed by gossip writers. As a means of corralling (or expelling) the wayward and eccentric, gossip is acknowledged to be an efficient social mechanism. The aim of gossip could be either to reform or to stigmatize the sinner. Enquist and Leimar (1993) and Dunbar (2004), in this volume, maintain that gossip is a kind of informal policing device for controlling free riders and social cheats. In fact, these authors posit that, evolutionarily, this is the most important function of language in general and gossip in particular. It is not much of a deductive leap to realize that what one hears about others can just as easily be said to others about oneself; in this way, we can learn how to behave—what to do and what not to do—from listening to gossip.
Much of Gluckman’s (1963) research focused on the coercive aspect of gossip from the perspective of the group. Paine (1967) countered that it is “the individual who should be taken into account in forwarding and protecting individual interests” (p. 278). Building on the work of both Paine (1967, 1970) and Goffman (1959), Cox (1970) wrote that gossip occurs when a person “directly interferes in another’s impression-management, hence forcing the audience to redefine his victim’s role”
Conformity is essential for the survival of the group as a whole, which may account for the particularly vitriolic form of gossip observed in groups under pressure to survive and in open competition with one another
Gossip’s potential to restrict freedom motivates people not only to minimize their eccentricities but also to minimize gossip about themselves whenever possible. People might try to be present, for example, when they sense they may be being talked about, or they may try to ferret out the sources of gossip about themselves. Haviland observed that although people are intensely and often indiscreetly curious about their neighbors, they go to considerable lengths to hide details of their own daily lives.
Netherlands police already admitted to using tactics that would be very similar to gangstalking to prevent suspects from adopting radical and extremist views – they call it “disturbing”. Another attempt to put gangstalking in perspective as to how it would be used in broader context as to war on terror, radicalization and AL-queda. From the bat I just want to put on the record that these ideas are foreign to me and don’t pass any legitimacy test described as a threat to our way of life. And I’m not trying to be oppositional and anti-authority, rather strictly speaking from “evidence based” logic. I’m no expert in geopolitics or military matters and do not try to push any agenda, simply try to look at it critically. Up to this point there is struggle to even prove existence of so called vast terrorism network called “AL-queda”.
Of course legitimacy of the claim got achieved over time throughout extensive propaganda by constantly ingraining the belief into public mind by reinforcing it through hysteria and effects on terrorism incidents. It’s pretty much a label or brand, with little to back it up. Yes you can point to some acts of terrorism and claim it as a evidence, but it just as well could be isolated incidents and not related to each other. So my counter argument is similar to what gangstalking victims experience when pointing towards evidence of organized harassment. Terrorism purely as ideology just doesn’t pass any test of cognitive motivation or psyche. Even most insane psychopaths kill with some sort of motivation, not just for joy of killing. Terrorism is just one of the military tools to achieve some sort of goal in destructive fashion and used on both sides of conflict, except in this case another side is undefinable in conventional sense. So am I ignorant about a threat and should investigate more into it as media can’t deliver complex issues without reducing it to digestible content that loses much of the sense. One could say that it appears that western world is experiencing organized stalking of geopolitical proportions where stressors(terrorism) are used to achieve some sort of goal to transform society through incremental steps (if we assume that Al-queda exists and doing it with some sort of logic). If looking from terrorist point of view I have trouble understanding what they achieved and how it’s could be useful for them and what are long term goals. As far as I can tell the only benefactor (profit wise) is military industrial complex. Western society just kept going on apart of being shocked from time to time, the only changes to the way of our lives came from above in a form of protective and restrictive measures. Being killed in terrorism attack statistically is so low that in comparison with other threats (like traffic accident) it’s clearly hyped for political purposes.
Yesterday I was reading into theory of lone wolf radicalization threat along with counter-radicalization studies that comes along with it. Again myriad of contrived and conflicting research. The struggle to understand and define the threat in a way that would make any sense. Most of the focus is on circumstances, triggers and factors that influence violent act, not radicalization itself. I’ve read 70 pages of these thesis (local copy) and last paragraph caught my eye:
Another central question that perplexes students of the radicalization phenomenon is how it actually happens. If efforts are made to understand receptivity to violent ideology, rather than just the ideology itself, the process by which radicalization occurs assumes great importance. What is the biological, specifically neurobiological, process that occurs as people come to adopt new radical views? Does radicalization reduce individual use of traditional rational choice cost‐benefit trade‐off in favor of an emotional response, or does the nature of the cost‐benefit trade‐off itself change? Do people use different parts of the brain in responding to stimulus as they radicalize, or are the parts they use rewired with this new information? How does social validation facilitate these changes? These are just a few of the issues that lie at the heart of the radicalization puzzle.
It kind of strange to raise questions like this as to what they could be gaining from knowing such thing. So how do you define radicalization itself? Wikipedia provides this definition: Radicalization (or radicalization) is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo. OK this definition is subjective and any individual has objections and rejects certain aspects of status quo. Military is only interested in radicalization from the point of violent action. How to detect it for purposes of prevention – imagine being able to scan brains of a crowd of people and detect one with violent destructive intent. Or maybe another option – how it could be triggered and how to exploit it to their own purposes. Imagine making subtle changes in multiple dispersed actors in enemy country where they simultaneously go postal. How is that for a weapon of mass destruction and mass effect? I know it could be misinterpreted and rejected easily, but if you wanted to research radicalization process under controlled conditions gangstalking could be one of the ways to achieve as person is forced to reject status quo by going through intense rejection and social isolation as it’s something that is so unfair and undemocratic, but in a democratic society that is supposed to be safe and caring. So chances are for violence and lashing out are elevated. Who would benefit from lone disenfranchised person desperate act? The problem with the military might be not the perceived threat itself, but defining and shaping the perception of the threat according to changing capabilities and technologies to justify the use of emerging exotic weapons.