This is interesting article as it shows then government is forced to look at organized stalking seriously since it’s used as one of the tools as part of influence campaign for destabilizing the political order by designated terrorist organization ETA in Basque Country. The name is very appropriate and most targets from around the world would agree with such label – psychological terrorism. Of course the most obvious culprit is CIA (or as some refer to it as organized crime, mafia, alqaeda, etc having examined only little bit information of what is allowed for them to examine), but Spanish government can’t really do much as it’s probably heavily infiltrated and compromised by CIA as is the case with the rest of EU/World.
This paper defines and analyzes the harassment perpetrated by ETA’s terrorist network in the Basque Country, providing a taxonomy of its strategies of psychological violence. The usefulness of this taxonomy has been tested and contrasted by means of a content analysis of 19 testimonies of persons who were the victims of violence by the terrorist network. The taxonomy of strategies of psychological violence is made up of four dimensions that emphasize the actions on the context of the persons affected, and on their emotional state, cognitions, and behaviour. Results show the predominance of emotional and cognitive strategies.
Second sub-category is formed essentially by different forms of verbal abuse: «I find myself walking past a particular bar (refers to bars which ETA sympathizers frequent), and hearing somebody say —there goes that bastard—». Stigmatization consists of acts perpetrated fundamentally in a public space with the aim of marking out a person. This may involve graffiti, pictures, banners or other forms in public places, designating the person as an «enemy» and as a «target» of the terrorist network: «I frequently received insults in the street…». Though these acts can entail other strategies, as a threat, they have a wider impact because the person is stigmatized in the presence of neighbours, workmates or classmates, and society: «My name was written in insulting banners at the Faculty in which I studied». With Control-surveillance of daily activities the target is usually informed by the Security Forces that he/she has appeared on a list of targets of the terrorist network. Some collaborators or even sympathizers may obtain information on the target which could be used to aid future acts of violence. These collaborators may be from his/her neighbourhood or work, among others. This, together with being a potential target of the terrorist network, may cause uncertainty: «Some of my neighbours try to get information on potential targets to pass onto the terrorists. The police told me that a shop assistant of a greengrocer’s close to my home was doing this». Restrictive acts of freedoms may also include elements of other strategies, but here the nuance consists of putting pressure on the target through the presence of people. This pressure may be applied by a public demonstration or protest march in front of the person, thus restricting their freedom. «The radicals (referring to ETA sympathizers) gathered in front of my home»; «…A dozen or more young radicals arrived, and they insulted and threatened me, and placed a banner against the doorway of my home».
A strategy of isolation and social exclusion, attempts to ostracise the target and encourage his/her isolation in society. Sometimes by means of intimidation of persons of his/her socialenvironment: «We often went to a bar. We thought they were friends…, we used to have a good time, we used to drink a few beers there… the night began there… and then one day, we were taken to the back room of the bar. They told us they had received a letter threatening to burn down the bar if they continued to sell us beers». The frequency of this was the lowest. It is important to point out that in small towns or villages where the terrorist network’s sympathizers may be predominant, it is easier to control and encourage the isolation of the person
The evolution of ETA’s structure -both its cells and its network has facilitated a new form of violence in the Basque Country. This aggression has changed towards continual harassment reinforced by selective physical violence. According to De la Calle (2007) the new terrorist network strategy of kale borroka violence including PV now plays an alternative role as a complementary tool to terrorist murders. From here, new groups have been victimized by pressurising Basque society and creating insecurity and fear. The terrorist network has tried to discourage people who express their opposition to the organization, using a legitimation discourse of intimidation and blackmail (Van den Broek, 2004). This makes terrorism a social communication mechanism, aimed at modifying behaviour by combining coercion and persuasion (Schmid, 2004).